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MAKING TREATY IMPLEMENTATION MORE LIKE
STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION
Jean Galbraith*
Both statutes and treaties are the “supreme law of the land,” and yet quite
different practices have developed with respect to their implementation. For
statutes, all three branches have embraced the development of administrative
law, which allows the executive branch to translate broad statutory directives
into enforceable obligations. But for treaties, there is a far more cumbersome
process. Unless a treaty provision contains language that courts interpret to be
directly enforceable, they will deem it to require implementing legislation from
Congress. This Article explores and challenges the perplexing disparity be-
tween the administration of statutes and treaties. It shows that the conven-
tional assumption that Congress must implement treaties that are not directly
enforceable by courts stems from an unduly narrow historical perspective. In-
stead, largely forgotten nineteenth-century practice and cases reveal that the
executive branch can implement treaties so as to make them enforceable in the
courts. Drawing on this past practice, this Article argues that it is time to
reconfigure the administration of treaties. In at least some circumstances, the
executive branch should be able to translate treaty provisions into court-en-
forceable obligations in a manner comparable to the statutory context, includ-
ing through rulemaking by administrative agencies. This approach is
particularly desirable for multilateral regulatory treaties, which have come to
play an increasingly important role in global governance.
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Introduction
There is a curious contrast between how statutes and treaties function
within our constitutional system. Both are the “supreme Law of the Land,”1
and yet quite different practices have developed with respect to their admin-
istration and enforcement. Since at least the New Deal, all three branches
have embraced a pragmatic approach to the administration of statutes, one
that puts a premium on effectiveness. This approach accepts that Congress
can give broad statutory directives that administrative agencies or other ex-
ecutive branch actors translate into enforceable obligations through
rulemaking or other agency action. This in turn provides Congress with “the
necessary resources of flexibility and practicality . . . to perform its
function.”2
For treaties, the process of translating generalized directives into en-
forceable obligations is far more cumbersome. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated that unless a treaty provision is itself directly enforceable in the courts,
it will be deemed “non-self-executing” such that only Congress can act to
make it enforceable.3 In other words, unlike in the statutory context, the
executive branch cannot be the administrative intermediary between a treaty
provision and the courts. Instead, it takes a statute to administer the treaty,
and thus one supreme law of the land is needed to implement another.
1. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Throughout this Article, I use the word “treaties” to refer
to international agreements that the United States has joined or seeks to join following the
process set forth in the Treaty Clause, which provides that the president “shall have Power, by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the
Senators present concur.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. My analysis in this Article only applies to such
treaties and does not apply to other kinds of international agreements entered into by the
United States.
2. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944) (quoting Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S.
1, 15 (1939)).
3. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–26 (2008).
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This added hurdle poses particular challenges for treaties, especially
multilateral ones, that seek to regulate the conduct of private individuals. In
the years since the end of the Cold War, these regulatory treaties have be-
come an increasing part of global governance, appearing in contexts as di-
verse as business, security, and environmental protection.4 Like the drafters
of congressional statutes, the negotiators of these treaties can prefer broad
directives because of their usefulness in accommodating changing condi-
tions and because of the advantages that ambiguity can offer to achieving
consensus. In addition, for reasons based in their own domestic law, negoti-
ators from other countries often require that commitments in treaties use
language that obligates domestic action rather than directly constitutes this
action.5 Regulatory treaties thus are often not directly enforceable by courts,
and the need for congressional action makes it difficult and sometimes im-
possible for their provisions to be implemented. Getting an administrative
agency to rulemake can be challenging, but getting Congress to pass a statute
is likely to be far harder. There is no certainty that Congress will act in a
timely manner or even that it will act at all. To give a particularly egregious
example, in 1992, the Senate advised and consented to an important treaty
on the transportation of hazardous waste and yet today—twenty-four years
later—Congress has still not passed legislation to implement the treaty’s
commitments.6
The challenge of administering treaty commitments can affect the entire
treaty-making process. U.S. negotiators are fully aware of the difficulties of
getting Congress to pass implementing legislation. Sometimes they respond
by seeking to make treaty commitments that are explicitly “self-executing,”7
but this is often not feasible, particularly for multilateral treaties.8 A further
strategy is to seek to limit the international commitments undertaken by the
United States that will require domestic legal enforcement to actions that are
already authorized by existing U.S. statutes.9 This strategy curtails the possi-
ble scope of international cooperation. It also adds to the reasons for the
4. Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 Harv. Int’l. L.J.
321, 344–45, 349–352 (2011) (describing this trend and observing that “[u]nlike previous
practice, seemingly now the default position in international negotiations . . . is the regulation
of individual behavior.”).
5. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 599, 634 (2008); see also Anthony
Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 178–95 (2d ed. 2007) (describing the range of
domestic approaches with respect to treaty implementation).
6. Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes, U.S. Dep’t St., http://www.state.gov/e/oes/
eqt/chemicalpollution/83016.htm [https://perma.cc/4YPH-GH6A].
7. E.g., Treaty Concerning Defense Trade Cooperation, Austl.-U.S., pmbl., Sept. 5, 2007,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-10 (2007) [hereinafter Austl. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty]
(expressing the understanding that “the provisions of this Treaty are self-executing in the
United States”). For the complicated further story regarding this treaty and a similar one
between the United States and Great Britain, see infra notes 240–242 and accompanying text.
8. See Vázquez, supra note 5, at 668.
9. See, e.g., S. Exec. Rep. No. 109-18, at 6 (2006) (emphasizing the lack of need for
implementing legislation with respect to the U.N. Convention against Corruption); John B.
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president to move away from making treaties altogether. A signature move
of the Obama Administration had been to join the United States to major
multilateral international agreements without seeking approval from the
Senate on the grounds that their terms can already be implemented under
existing U.S. law.10 The more hurdles the treaty-making process creates for
the executive branch, the stronger its incentives are to bypass this process
altogether.
The assumption that Congress needs to be the intermediary between
otherwise unenforceable treaty provisions and the courts is prevalent, and
yet its foundations are surprisingly unexamined. Most scholars addressing
the issue of treaty non-self-execution devote their attention mainly to what
makes a treaty provision non-self-executing rather than to how provisions
that are not directly enforceable are to be implemented.11 Those scholars
who have considered executive branch implementation have done so largely
by relying on the Take Care Clause or by emphasizing that the president’s
foreign-affairs powers give the president authority to execute treaties.12 A
foreign-affairs perspective also pervaded both the briefing and the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Medelĺın v. Texas,13 the case that appears to cement Con-
gress’s exclusive authority to translate treaty directives that are not directly
enforceable into law that is enforceable by the courts.14
This Article explores and challenges the assumption that Congress is the
only appropriate intermediary between the courts and treaty provisions that
are not directly enforceable. Instead, it argues that actors in the executive
branch can serve this intermediary role, at least when certain conditions are
met. The argument rests not on the president’s foreign-affairs powers, but
rather on the claim that the legal and structural arrangements that have
Bellinger, III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, The United States and International Law 6
(June 6, 2007), http://photos.state.gov/libraries/unesco/182433/pdfs/JBB_Speech_on_Interna
tional_Law_6-5-07.pdf [https://perma.cc/G65P-UXUT] (“[W]henever we consider taking on
new obligations, we examine a number of factors . . . [including w]ill we be in a position to
implement, or will there be complications because of domestic law?”).
10. See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
11. See generally, e.g., David J. Bederman, Medellı́n’s New Paradigm for Treaty Interpreta-
tion, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 529 (2008); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008
Sup. Ct. Rev. 131; Oona A. Hathaway et al., International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in
U.S. Courts, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 51 (2012); David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate
Against Treaties?: Equivalence, Duality, and Non-Self-Execution, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 2228
(2010); David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v. Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-
Executing Treaties, 53 Harv. Int’l L.J. 135, 183 (2012); Vázquez, supra note 5; Ernest A.
Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law”, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 91 (2009).
12. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, Open Doors, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 11, 22–32 (2009)
(emphasizing the president’s foreign-affairs powers in arguing that the president should be
able to implement non-self-executing treaties, although also touching more generally on ad-
ministrative law parallels); Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 331,
353–72 (2008) (arguing that the Take Care Clause authorizes the president to implement at
least some non-self-executing treaties).
13. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
14. See infra notes 199–202 and accompanying text.
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developed with regard to the administration of statutes can constitutionally
and appropriately be applied to treaty implementation. This approach offers
new insight as to both how Congress came to be assumed to be the exclusive
implementer of non-self-executing treaty provisions and whether this as-
sumption is warranted today.
The broad lens used in this Article reveals that the implementation of
treaties and statutes diverged over time less because of preordained constitu-
tional differences than because of different developmental paths. The con-
ventional account of Congress’s exclusive role in implementing otherwise
nonenforceable treaties depends heavily on dicta in Foster v. Neilson, an 1829
Supreme Court decision that described treaty enforcement as a matter for
either Congress or the courts.15 This account overlooks other persuasive evi-
dence from nineteenth-century practice and case law that shows that, far
from being exceptional, the administration of treaties developed in ways that
closely paralleled the administration of statutes, including through reliance
on executive branch intermediation.
More specifically, a close look at past practice reveals that the executive
branch has in fact already exercised power delegated by treaties to create
court-enforceable law out of generalized treaty directives. This practice is
most evident with regard to nineteenth-century Indian treaties, which often
explicitly delegated administrative authority to the president, including
rulemaking authority. These treaties were blessed by courts, including at
times the Supreme Court, in ways that undercut the conventional assump-
tion that treaty enforceability is a matter for either Congress or the courts.
Instead, during the nineteenth and into the early twentieth century, the im-
plementation of treaties came to rely on executive branch administration in
ways that resembled the rise of administrative law in the statutory context.
This parallel between the treaty context and the statutory context is sug-
gested as well by broader uses of the terms “self-executing” and “not self-
executing.” The Supreme Court began to use this terminology in the late
nineteenth century with respect not only to treaties, but also to the two
other types of supreme law of the land—the Constitution and statutes. This
similar language suggests that the Court viewed treaty implementation not
as exceptional, but rather as raising the same kinds of questions posed by the
implementation of law generally. Moreover, while early uses of “not self-
executing” almost always referred to a need for legislative implementation,
later case law came to use this term in the statutory context with respect to a
need for executive branch implementation as well. This suggests that the
Court did not intend the phrase to be a term of art about the need for
legislative implementation, but rather to mean more broadly that some actor
needed to take further steps to trigger court enforceability.
Yet as executive branch administration of statutes took off, the adminis-
tration of treaties stagnated. A selective narrative developed about treaty ad-
ministration—one that privileged the dicta in Foster while overlooking that
15. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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this dicta arose at a time when the administrative capacities of the executive
branch were far less developed. The arrested development of treaty adminis-
tration relative to statutory administration was doubtless helped by the dif-
fering degrees of practical imperatives. The need for executive branch
administration of regulatory statutes grew increasingly apparent with the
rise of the national economy and culminated in the twentieth century in
sweeping constitutional acceptance of delegations from Congress to admin-
istrative agencies. The rise of globalization was slower, and it was not until
near the end of the twentieth century that multilateral treaties with a strong
regulatory character became a common feature of the international legal
landscape. By that time, the assumption that Congress must implement
non-self-executing treaty provisions had become widespread and remains
so, even as the sharp uptick in regulatory treaties in the years since the end
of the Cold War has made this assumption increasingly cumbersome.
This Article argues that that we can and should abandon the assumption
that Congress has exclusive authority to translate non-self-executing treaty
provisions into obligations that are enforceable in the courts.16 Instead, we
should conclude that executive branch actors can have the constitutional
authority to act as the intermediary between otherwise unenforceable treaty
provisions and the courts through administrative action. The normative jus-
tification for this position is similar to the one that underlies statutory dele-
gations to the executive branch. Treaties, like statutes, “must often be
adapted to conditions involving details with which it is impracticable for the
[treaty makers] to deal directly”17 and “[w]ithout capacity to give authoriza-
tions [to executive branch actors,] we should have the anomaly of a . . .
power [where] in many circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a
futility.”18 Administrative law also points the way to structural and procedu-
ral safeguards that can further responsible treaty implementation by execu-
tive branch actors.
The rise of administrative law required the acquiescence of all three
branches of government. For the executive branch to have the authority to
implement otherwise nonenforceable treaty provisions through administra-
tive actions, the acquiescence of the Senate and the courts would similarly be
needed. On the surface, the Supreme Court’s decision in Medelĺın appears to
close the door on such implementation: citing Foster, it states categorically
16. As I discuss infra note 224, my focus here is on effects rather than terminology. I
favor a broader use of the term “non-self-executing” to refer to treaty provisions that require
action, but not necessarily intervening legislative action, before they give rise to court-enforce-
able obligations. Such a use would be consistent with how the Supreme Court has come to use
the term in the statutory context. See infra Section II.B.2. When I use the term here, I use it in
this way, except when context makes clear that I am describing narrower uses by others. But
one could also define non-self-executing treaty provisions as those that can only be imple-
mented through legislation—an approach seemingly taken by the Supreme Court in Medelĺın
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)—and yet recognize that some other treaty provisions that are not
immediately enforceable in court can be made to be so by executive branch administration.
17. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15 (1939).
18. Id. (quoting Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935)).
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that Congress is the actor charged with implementing treaty provisions that
are not themselves directly enforceable.19 Yet a deeper reading of Medelĺın
suggests a more nuanced conclusion. Medelĺın emphasizes the centrality of a
treaty’s text to understanding its import for U.S. domestic law.20 The text of
the treaty at issue in Medelĺın did not explicitly delegate administrative au-
thority to executive branches of government, and thus, the Court concluded,
the Senate had not intended such a delegation when it advised and con-
sented to the treaty.21 But Medelĺın should not be read to bar executive
branch implementation where the text of a treaty spells out such authority
or where the Senate specifies the delegation of such authority in its resolu-
tion of advice and consent. This Article thus argues that during the making
of future treaties, Senate resolutions providing advice and consent could
specify the delegation of authority to administer these treaties to executive
branch actors. More boldly, the Article suggests that the text of some al-
ready-negotiated treaties might bestow such authority on the president in
the absence of contrary signals from the Senate.
The Article unfolds as follows. Part I describes how treaties and statutes
are implemented in the United States today and identifies the far greater
political and legal hurdles that confront the implementation of non-self-
executing treaties. Part II explores how this disparity arose. It first describes
the conventional account of this disparity, which relies heavily on dicta from
Foster. It then offers an alternative narrative based in past practice and case
law that shows similarities between the administration of treaties and of stat-
utes, including examples of how the executive branch has turned treaty pro-
visions into court-enforceable obligations through administrative action.
Part III lays out a forward-looking argument for empowering the executive
branch to implement most types of regulatory treaty provisions. It argues
that treaties can be—and in some cases already are—structured to permit
this implementation in ways that are consistent with Medelĺın.
Although this Article argues that the implementation of treaties should
more closely resemble the implementation of statutes, it does not call for
perfect parity. Treaties and statutes have their differences. The executive
branch plays a more dominant role in the making of treaties than in the
making of statutes. Treaties are as likely or perhaps more likely than statutes
to be precise in their substantive specifications, but they are less likely to
concern themselves with structural and procedural issues of domestic law.
Constitutional practice establishes that some things must be done by statute
rather than treaty, including at a minimum the appropriation of money. The
foreign-affairs dimensions of treaties might support a somewhat different set
of procedural safeguards related to implementation than those that are typi-
cally used in administrative law. These differences all matter, although they
receive only brief consideration here. The hope underlying this Article is
that, in future practice, we will be working through the implications of these
19. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 525–26 (citing Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 315).
20. Id. at 514.
21. Id. at 527.
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differences, rather than continuing to rely on the outdated and cumbersome
process that exists today.
I. The Law of the Land Today: A Tale of Two Doctrines
The Supremacy Clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .22
This text makes both laws and treaties the “supreme law of the land,”
and yet today they are not treated alike. Instead, the administration of trea-
ties is subject to a perceived constitutional constraint that is absent from the
administration of statutes.23 Where a treaty provision uses language that
does not sound directly enforceable, intervening action by Congress is
deemed a necessary predicate to enforcement by the courts. This Part sum-
marizes the current difference between the implementation of treaties and
statutes in terms of its doctrinal underpinnings and its practical conse-
quences. Its purpose is descriptive. Later Parts explore how this difference
arose and the extent to which it is warranted today.
A. Treaties
The status of treaties as the “law of the land” is intricately bound up
with two terms which do not appear in the Constitution. These terms are
“self-executing” and “non-self-executing.”24 Whether treaty provisions are or
are not self-executing has become a crucial inquiry for courts in deciding
whether they can enforce a treaty’s requirements. The current contours of
this inquiry are established by the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in Medel-
ĺın v. Texas, which is the Court’s most extended treatment of treaty imple-
mentation to date.25
Medelĺın was an important and controversial case. A few years earlier,
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) had ruled that the United States
had an international legal obligation to reconsider the cases of dozens of
22. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
23. For reasons of space, I do not discuss certain ways in which treaties and statutes are
treated similarly, such as the last-in-time rule, which provides that where there is a conflict
between a self-executing treaty and a statute, the more recent one prevails. See Curtis A.
Bradley, International Law in the U.S. Legal System 52–53 (2d ed. 2015). I also do not
discuss whether a specific cause of action is needed before a private party can bring a claim
based on a treaty or a statute—a matter to which the Supreme Court has paid increasing
attention. See Hathaway et al., supra note 11, at 56–75 (describing this shift in the treaty
context); Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Ex-
panding the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 Va. L. Rev. 93, 100–06 (2005) (summarizing
shifts in the Court’s approach in the statutory context).
24. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 (not including these terms).
25. 552 U.S. at 491.
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Mexican nationals on death row, including Mr. Medellı́n.26 Moreover, the
United Nations Charter requires the United States to “undertake[ ] to com-
ply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to
which it is a party.”27 Given the ICJ’s ruling and the U.S. commitments
under the U.N. Charter, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum
instructing state courts to reconsider the death row cases at issue in the ICJ
case.28 In Medelĺın, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the Texas
courts had to implement the ICJ decision, either because these courts had a
direct obligation to comply with it or because the Bush Administration
memo gave rise to such an obligation.29
The Court considered the case to turn on whether or not the U.N.
Charter provision was self-executing.30 In the process, it had to address what
“self-executing” and “non-self-executing” meant. The Court explained: “The
label “self-executing” has on occasion been used to convey different mean-
ings. What we mean by ‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has automatic do-
mestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a ‘non-self-
executing’ treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable fed-
eral law.”31 This passage distinguishes self-executing and non-self-executing
treaties based on their effects. A self-executing treaty has “automatic domes-
tic effect as federal law.”32 By contrast, a non-self-executing treaty has what
sounds like a distinctly lesser status: it is not “by itself” enforceable in the
courts.33
In addition to distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-exe-
cuting treaties based on their immediate legal effect, Medelĺın made two fur-
ther, important pronouncements. First, the Court emphasized that the text
of a treaty provision is central to the determination of whether or not the
provision is self-executing.34 The Court concluded that the language “under-
takes to comply”35 in the U.N. Charter provision at issue was not meant to
give rise to obligations that were directly enforceable in domestic courts, but
rather merely committed treaty parties “to take future action through their
26. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12
¶¶ 106, 121–41 (Mar. 31).
27. U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1.
28. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 503.
29. Id. at 504, 523.
30. Id. at 505–06.
31. Id. at 505 n.2. Although the Court distinguishes here between self-executing and
non-self-executing treaties, in fact, its analysis focuses more on self-executing and non-self-
executing treaty provisions. The practice of the political branches also accepts that a treaty need
not be uniformly self-executing or non-self-executing. See, e.g., 152 Cong. Rec. 18,398 (2006)
(containing, in a Senate resolution of advice and consent to a treaty, a declaration providing
that “the provisions of the Convention (with the exception of Articles 44 and 46) are non-self-
executing”).
32. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 506–07.
35. Id. at 508 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 94, ¶ 1).
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political branches to comply with an ICJ decision.”36 The Court explained
that the text of a treaty provision is crucial to determining whether or not
the provision is self-executing because this language “is after all what the
Senate looks to in deciding whether to approve the treaty.”37
The practical effect of Medelĺın’s textual focus is that the Court may
consider many treaty provisions non-self-executing. This is more likely with
regard to multilateral treaties, which are fewer in number than bilateral trea-
ties but likely to be of greater importance.38 As Justice Breyer observed in
dissent, different countries have different domestic legal processes for imple-
menting treaties.39 For example, the United Kingdom and certain other
countries always require legislation to implement treaty obligations into do-
mestic law.40 Because of the diversity of legal mechanisms governing treaty
implementation, it can be hard for treaty negotiators to use language that
sounds immediately binding across legal contexts.41 This issue is especially
acute for regulatory treaties—treaties that require states to regulate the sub-
stantive conduct of individuals, corporations, or other nonstate actors. This
is a category of treaties that has blossomed since the end of the Cold War,
whether because of the increased ease of international cooperation or be-
cause of the increased need for cross-border coordination in response to
globalization.42 Since regulatory treaties cannot directly apply to conduct in
countries in which treaties do not have direct effect as domestic law, these
36. Id. (quoting the U.S. amicus brief and adding that “[the Court] agree[s] with this
construction of Article 94”).
37. Id. at 514.
38. By my calculations, of the treaties submitted by the president to the Senate from 2001
through 2010, given advice and consent during this period, and assigned unique treaty num-
bers by the Senate, fifty-eight were bilateral and thirty-eight were multilateral. (Two of these
multilateral treaties came packaged in single treaty numbers with a set of related bilateral
treaties that, in light of their shared treaty number, are not separately counted here.) The
Senate attached declarations of non-self-execution or partial non-self-execution to three of the
bilateral treaties and thirteen of the multilateral treaties. All except one of these declarations
came subsequent to the Court’s decision in Medelĺın. The dataset was built from the Library of
Congress’s treaty collection, Treaty Documents, U.S. Congress, https://www.congress.gov/
treaties [https://perma.cc/84MK-XEPR], and is on file with the Michigan Law Review).
39. See Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 541, 546–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
40. Aust, supra note 5, at 189–95. For the United Kingdom, this requirement serves as a
democratic safeguard, since there is no constitutional obligation to obtain Parliament’s advice
and consent to the treaty. Id. at 189 (further describing the practice that has developed of
giving Parliament twenty-one days of notice prior to ratifying a treaty so as to allow for
consultation).
41. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 546–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As noted above, bilateral treaties
are more likely to be immediately enforceable in courts. A good example is tax treaties, which
are enforceable on their own, although supplemented in their interpretation by technical gui-
dance issued by the Treasury Department. See Michael S. Kirsch, The Limits of Administrative
Guidance in the Interpretation of Tax Treaties, 87 Tex. L. Rev. 1063, 1073–77, 1095–97 (2009).
42. For a discussion of these treaties and their rise, see Cogan, supra note 4, at 349–52.
Unlike treaties that require a nation to provide equal treatment to noncitizens (which can also
affect private behavior), these treaties tend to require nations to regulate their own citizens and
other actors on their soil with respect to behavior that has transborder implications.
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treaties tend to use language that expressly contemplates future action.
Sometimes, especially where criminal penalties are at issue, regulatory trea-
ties explicitly call for implementing legislation, but at other times they spec-
ify the need for implementation without requiring that it be done through
legislation. By way of example, the Rotterdam Convention regarding trade in
hazardous chemicals provides that “[e]ach Party shall take such measures as
may be necessary to establish and strengthen its national infrastructures and
institutions for the effective implementation of this Convention. These mea-
sures may include, as required, the adoption or amendment of national legis-
lation or administrative measures.”43
Medelĺın’s other pronouncement involved the implementation of non-
self-executing treaties. The Court rebuffed the Bush Administration’s argu-
ment that the executive branch should be able to implement a non-self-
executing treaty provision like the U.N. Charter provision at issue.44 Instead,
it stated categorically that “[t]he responsibility for transforming an interna-
tional obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law
falls to Congress.”45 Because Congress had not passed legislation implement-
ing the U.N. Charter provision, the Texas courts were obligated to abide
neither by this provision itself nor by the president’s directive with respect to
it.46
In stating that Congress should implement non-self-executing treaties,
the Court effectively made it impossible for courts to treat non-self-execut-
ing treaties as the “law of the land.” For even if Congress does pass imple-
menting legislation, the courts will not be enforcing the treaty. Rather, they
will be enforcing a different “law of the land”—namely, the implementing
legislation itself.47 The Court justified the need for intervening legislation by
explaining that when a treaty is non-self-executing, there is an “understand-
ing that it is not to have domestic effect of its own force,” which in turn
“precludes the assertion that Congress has implicitly authorized the Presi-
dent—acting on his own—to achieve precisely the same result.”48 Rather,
“[i]f the Executive determines that a treaty should have domestic effect of its
own force, that determination may be implemented in ‘mak[ing]’ the treaty,
by ensuring that it contains language plainly providing for domestic
enforceability.”49
43. Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Haz-
ardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade art. 15, Sept. 10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S.
337 [hereinafter Rotterdam Convention] (emphasis added).
44. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 494.
45. Id. at 525–26.
46. Id. at 498–99.
47. See Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2081, 2107 (2014) (observing that since
the treaty at issue was not self-executing, the Court was only interpreting the implementing
legislation).
48. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 527. The Court may have meant “the Senate” where it speaks of
“Congress” here. See infra note 220.
49. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 526.
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Medelĺın was and is a controversial decision. Some scholars have argued
that it was wrongly decided.50 In addition, and more importantly for this
Article, there is substantial debate about its contours. Whether due to mud-
dled thinking, sloppy drafting, or studied ambiguity, “[t]he opinion is not a
model of clarity.”51 This lack of clarity is even stronger when Medelĺın is
considered against the backdrop of precedents and practice related to the
distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties. Indeed,
the disagreements are so substantial that the drafters of the treaty section of
the forthcoming Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law are having
great difficulty in preparing the section devoted to self-execution.52 Part III
returns to the question of how to understand Medelĺın going forward. For
now, however, it is enough to note that some treaty provisions are non-self-
executing and that Medelĺın states that such provisions may be translated
into court-enforceable obligations only by Congress.
B. Statutes
Courts typically do not begin their analysis of federal statutes by consid-
ering whether or not they are “self-executing.” Instead, it is a matter of
course that statutes are domestically enforceable federal law that can pre-
empt state laws. Although the Supremacy Clause will not necessarily provide
a cause of action, “once a case or controversy properly comes before a court,
judges are bound by federal law.”53 “Thus a court may not convict a criminal
defendant of violating a state law that federal law prohibits”54 and “a court
may not hold a civil defendant liable under state law for conduct federal law
requires.”55
Nonetheless, quite often courts do not directly enforce statutes. Instead,
as with non-self-executing treaties, they enforce intermediary actions. This is
50. E.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 563, 567 (2008);
Sloss, supra note 11, at 183.
51. Vázquez, supra note 5, at 647 (considering six possible ways to read Medelĺın). For a
few of the many other articles noting Medelĺın’s lack of clarity, see Curtis A. Bradley, Intent,
Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 540, 541 (2008); Michael D.
Ramsey, The Supremacy Clause, Original Meaning, and Modern Law, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 559, 612
(2013); and Sloss, supra note 11, at 183.
52. Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States:
Treaties, at xxiv (Am. Law Inst., Discussion Draft 2015) (noting that section 106, the draft
section on self-execution, is a “challenging Section that has been reworked several times”).
53. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1384 (2015). For a few of
the many pronouncements along these lines, see, for example, Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2013) (“[I]t has long been settled that state laws that conflict
with federal law are ‘without effect.’ ” (first citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746
(1981); and then citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819))), and
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500 (2012) (“The Supremacy Clause provides a clear
rule that federal law ‘shall be the supreme Law of the Land.’ ” (quoting U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.
2)).
54. Armstrong, 135 S. Ct. at 1384 (citing Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 499, 509
(1956)).
55. Id. (citing Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2476–77).
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the case with many regulatory statutes. Since at least the New Deal, the Su-
preme Court has accepted that Congress can effectively delegate regulatory
authority to administrative agencies or other actors within the executive
branch, provided that it adequately specifies the purposes for which the del-
egated authority is to be exercised.56 Such delegation is a cornerstone of ad-
ministrative law and is essential to effective national governance.
The statutes themselves specify the need for intermediate action prior to
court enforcement. Major regulatory statutes operate by identifying statu-
tory objectives and then delegating authority to administrative agencies to
carry out these objectives, often through rulemaking. Thus, the “Clean Air
Act directs the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate emissions of
hazardous air pollutants from power plants if the Agency finds regulation
‘appropriate and necessary,’ ”57 and the Federal Power Act “authorizes the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . to regulate ‘the sale of electric
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.’ ”58 It is the regulations that
these agencies promulgate, rather than the statutes that underlie them, that
apply directly to power plants and electricity wholesalers and may be en-
forced against them in adjudicative proceedings.59 In these examples and
many others, the intermediary chosen by Congress is an administrative
agency, but this is not always the case. Sometimes Congress impliedly speci-
fies itself as the intermediary—as when it authorizes uses of funds but leaves
the actual appropriations of these funds to an appropriations act.60 At other
times Congress specifies the president as the intermediary, as when it dele-
gates to the president the authority to activate a statutory provision.61
The parallels between treaties and statutes whose enforcement requires
an intermediary are apparent. In both contexts, what the courts ultimately
enforce are intermediary actions rather than the underlying treaty or statute:
56. Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405,
470 (1989). The origins of administrative law go back far further than the New Deal and even
predate the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887. For an overview
of the practice of administrative law in the century after the Founding, see generally Jerry L.
Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years
of American Administrative Law (2012).
57. E.g., Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2704 (2015).
58. E.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 766 (2016). In these examples
and throughout this Article, I focus more on agency rulemaking (especially formal rulemak-
ing) than on agency adjudication. I do so because I think it is more likely to be relevant for
treaty implementation than agency adjudication, although my argument is broad enough to
cover a range of types of agency action. For a discussion of the rise of rulemaking, see Reuel E.
Schiller, Rulemaking’s Promise: Administrative Law and Legal Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53
Admin. L. Rev. 1139 (2001).
59. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001) (noting how regula-
tions carry the force of law where Congress has delegated such authority to an agency).
60. See Jessica Tollestrup, Cong. Research Serv., R42388, The Congressional Ap-
propriations Process: An Introduction 10–12 (2014).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 312 (1936)
(describing a statute that gave the president authority to proclaim certain acts criminal upon
making a determination that this would advance specified objectives).
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for treaties, Congress’s implementing legislation, and for statutes, regula-
tions (or other forms of agency action). In both contexts, moreover, the
reason that intermediary action is needed is because the underlying treaty or
statute is said to require it. In the regulatory context, Congress specifies the
need for intervening regulation, and in Medelĺın the Court inferred that, in
giving its advice and consent, the Senate had intended the treaty provision at
issue to need implementing legislation.62 In light of these parallels, Ernest
Young has argued that the Court’s decision in Medelĺın simply reflects the
“normalization” of treaty implementation within our constitutional sys-
tem.63 Yet although the parallels are strong conceptually, there are large and
consequential differences between the two schemes—differences that disfa-
vor treaties relative to statutes.
C. Implications
Despite the surface similarities, treaties deemed to require implementing
legislation face much steeper barriers to domestic enforcement than do stat-
utes that authorize administrative regulation. As a matter both of political
process and of legal oversight, it is likely to be far harder to get Congress to
pass implementing legislation than it is to get an executive branch actor to
regulate. The challenge of getting implementing legislation in turn casts a
shadow on the entire treaty-making process.
1. Differences in Political Process
Procedure and politics make it generally far easier to get an administra-
tive agency to issue a rule than to get Congress to pass a law. As a procedural
matter, getting a law passed requires not only a majority of congressional
votes and presidential approval, but also surmounting the numerous other
veto points that can arise from the committee process, the need for floor
time, and practices such as the filibuster.64 This process is all the harder
because it involves navigating the political disagreements of members of
Congress who, at the end of the day, each have a vote. Although agency
rulemaking is far from a cakewalk, it is a less fraught process. Indeed, ad-
ministrative law itself developed precisely because Congress recognized its
comparative disadvantage in handling fine-grained regulatory decisionmak-
ing. Congress delegates to agencies because of some or all of “the need to
leave technical questions to experts, politicians’ desire to duck blame for
unpopular choices . . . the inability of multimember legislatures to reach
62. Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–26 (2008).
63. Young, supra note 11, at 137; see also Bradley, supra note 11, at 142 (“Statutes dele-
gating implementation authority to the Executive provide a particularly close analogy to non-
self-executing treaties.”).
64. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1441, 1442–43 (2008).
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stable consensus, and the impossibility (or excessive cost) of anticipating and
resolving all relevant implementation issues in advance.”65
The process embraced by administrative law thus involves a steep initial
hurdle—the original congressional legislation—and then the easier step of
agency rulemaking. By contrast, the process for implementation is far more
stringent for a regulatory treaty that needs executing. It typically involves
two steep domestic hurdles, in addition to the often enormous challenge of
getting an internationally negotiated treaty in the first place. The first hurdle
is getting two-thirds of the Senate to advise and consent to the treaty, and
the second hurdle is getting Congress to pass the implementing legislation.66
Surmounting the first of these hurdles can of course help with the second
hurdle, since at least two-thirds of the Senate will have signed off on the
overall objectives contained in the treaty. Thus, sometimes implementing
legislation gets passed promptly.67 Yet as a report commissioned by the Sen-
ate Committee on Foreign Relations acknowledges, “Treaties approved by
the Senate have sometimes remained unfulfilled for long periods because
implementing legislation was not passed.”68 To give a recent example, the
Senate advised and consented to four non-self-executing treaties related to
nuclear security in September 2008, but it was not until seven years later—
in June 2015—that Congress passed implementing legislation for these trea-
ties.69 And for some treaties, the wait for implementing legislation is far
longer. The Senate advised and consented to the Basel Convention on the
Transportation of Hazardous Waste in 1992 and today—twenty-four years
later—Congress still has not passed implementing legislation.70
Congressional legislation implementing treaties often in turn relies on
delegations of rulemaking authority to executive branch actors. For all trea-
ties relating to radio communications, for example, a preexisting law dele-
gates to the Federal Communications Commission the authority to “[m]ake
such rules and regulations . . . as may be necessary to carry out the provi-
sions of . . . any treaty or convention insofar as it relates to the use of radio,
65. Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk,
and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1035, 1036–37 (2006).
66. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
67. For example, with respect to the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children
and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, the Senate gave its advice and consent,
and Congress passed implementing legislation within three years of the treaty’s submission to
the Senate. See Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-51 (1998).
68. Cong. Research Serv., 106th Cong., Treaties and Other International
Agreements: The Role of the United States Senate 20 (2001).
69. 154 Cong. Rec. 21775–76 (2008); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Passage of Im-
plementing Legislation for Nuclear Security Treaties (June 4, 2015), https://2009-2017.state
.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/06/243196.htm [https://perma.cc/8883-J3XB]. For another recent
example where implementing legislation is taking a while to be enacted, see Kristina Daugirdas
& Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International
Law, 108 Am. J. Int’l L. 516, 533 (2014) (describing fisheries treaties that received advice and
consent but were awaiting implementing legislation at the time of publication).
70. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 6.
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to which the United States is or may hereafter become a party.”71 Such
preauthorization effectively removes the hurdle of getting implementing leg-
islation, but it is far from common. More typically, implementing legislation
implements a specified treaty and, in doing so, delegates some regulatory
authority to administrative agencies or other executive branch actors. This
practice dates far back—the law passed in 1918 to implement the Migratory
Bird Treaty provided the secretary of agriculture with considerable regula-
tory authority72—and has become an important feature of regulatory trea-
ties. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, for example, give the EPA
regulatory authority to implement the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer.73 This heavy reliance on delegations to the execu-
tive branch reveals that Congress does not wish to retain all rulemaking
authority with respect to treaty implementation. It also adds yet a third layer
of process—besides advice and consent and implementing legislation—to
the already challenging and time-consuming task of turning regulatory
treaty obligations into enforceable domestic law.
2. Differences in Legal Oversight
Not only is implementing legislation harder than administrative
rulemaking to achieve as a structural matter, but such legislation also cannot
be mandated as a matter of domestic law. In the statutory context, once
Congress passes a law that instructs an agency to undertake administrative
rulemaking, that agency has a domestic legal obligation to comply. With this
domestic legal obligation comes some level of policing by the other two
branches. Although courts are reluctant to review agency inaction, they will
do so on occasion,74 and Congress has considerable soft-law tools it can use
to oversee agency behavior.
The oversight mechanisms for ensuring that Congress will legislate to
implement treaties are far weaker. Once the United States has ratified a
treaty, it does have an international legal obligation to act in compliance
with a treaty. But it is an unresolved question whether or not Congress has a
constitutional obligation to pass implementing legislation.75 Article I of the
Constitution does not specifically impose such obligation, although it does
give Congress the power—in addition to its other Article I powers—to pass
71. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (2012).
72. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, § 3, 40 Stat. 755, 755 (1918) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012)) (further providing that such “regulations shall become
effective when approved by the President”).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7671–7671q (2012).
74. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532–35 (2007). In addition, courts
review agency rulemaking to ensure that it is within the bounds of discretion accorded by the
statute and administrative law principles. See, e.g., id. at 516, 527.
75. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 204–05
(2d ed. 1996) (discussing the issue, which goes back to the 1796 debates related to the Jay
Treaty).
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such laws as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect other powers,76
and the Supreme Court has held that this encompasses treaty implementa-
tion.77 But the Necessary and Proper Clause is a power, not a clear obliga-
tion. While members of Congress might consider themselves legally,
morally, or pragmatically called upon to pass such implementing legislation,
there are no oversight mechanisms for ensuring treaty implementation that
are comparable to the ones available in the administration of statutes. There
is also little if any judicial oversight available for reviewing the content of
any implementing legislation that Congress does pass to see whether it faith-
fully implements the treaty.78
3. Consequences for Treaty Making
Taken together, the difficulties of approving implementing legislation
pose greater practical barriers than the difficulties of adopting administrative
rulemaking. These heightened difficulties affect not only the implementa-
tion of treaties, but also other aspects of the treaty-making process, includ-
ing the very decision to pursue a treaty in the first place. Three such
implications are particularly noteworthy.
First, the need for implementing legislation makes it hard for the United
States to fix situations in which it is found to be in violation of a non-self-
executing treaty. The aftermath of Medelĺın illustrates this problem. Despite
the fact that the United States is in violation of its international legal obliga-
tion to comply with the ICJ decision that formed the basis of Medellı́n’s
argument against Texas, to date, Congress has shown no serious interest in
legislating to achieve such compliance.79 Moreover, the approach taken by
the Court to determine whether or not a treaty is self-executing has “sent
State Department lawyers scrambling to determine how many other treaties
might also not be self-executing.”80 To the extent that Medelĺın has changed
the ground rules by making treaties that were thought to be self-executing
into non-self-executing ones, then compliance could become an issue with
these treaties as well.
Second, the high risk that Congress will fail to enact implementing legis-
lation has slowed U.S. practice with regard to treaty ratification. The execu-
tive branch now typically waits to ratify treaties until after Congress has
passed the implementing legislation that would be needed to comply with
76. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.
77. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
78. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding
a statutory amendment to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act despite its inconsistency with the
underlying treaty).
79. Steve Charnovitz, Editorial Comment, Correcting America’s Continuing Failure to
Comply with the Avena Judgment, 106 Am. J. Int’l L. 572, 577–78 (2012).
80. John Bellinger, Comments on “International Law at Home”, Opinio Juris (Feb. 24,
2012, 9:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/02/24/john-bellinger-comments-on-international-
law-at-home/ [https://perma.cc/3F25-2XER].
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the treaty.81 This is a sharp difference from the practice with regard to stat-
utes, since Congress does not delay the passage of its statutes until after
agencies have drawn up the regulations by which they will administer it.
Thus, with regard to treaties mentioned earlier, the United States did not
ratify the nuclear-security treaties until the passage of their implementing
legislation82 and to this date has not ratified the Basel Convention.83 Al-
though the decision not to ratify is safer from a compliance perspective, it
reduces the moral pressure on Congress to pass the implementing legislation
and also limits the voice of the United States in the treaty regimes that it is
waiting to join.84
Third, the need for separate implementing legislation for treaties that
are not directly enforceable adds to the incentives of the executive branch to
abandon treaties altogether in favor of other kinds of international commit-
ments. Practice accepts that congressional-executive agreements—which
consist of a combination of presidential approval and statutory authoriza-
tion—are a constitutionally acceptable way of entering into at least most
kinds of international agreements. Among other things, these congressional-
executive agreements are used for international trade agreements.85 Oona
Hathaway has argued that rather than making treaties that require the presi-
dent, two-thirds of the Senate, and an implementing statute, the executive
branch should shift to pursuing congressional-executive agreements almost
exclusively.86 These provide “in effect, one-stop shopping: the same act that
provides the authority to accede to the international agreement can also
make the necessary statutory changes to implement the obligation
incurred.”87
In addition to the increased use of congressional-executive agreements,
an even more striking move away from treaties is occurring—a move that is
itself dependent on administrative law. In negotiating treaties that will be
81. Jean Galbraith, Congress’s Treaty-Implementing Power in Historical Practice, 56 Wm &
Mary L. Rev. 59, 76 & nn.61–62 (2014).
82. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 69.
83. Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes, supra note 6. For some other environmental
conventions, the executive branch has been seeking implementing legislation before or con-
temporaneous with its pursuit of Senate advice and consent. See Elana Schor, Obama Admin
Steps Up Pressure to Ratify Treaties on Toxics, N.Y. Times (Sept. 24, 2010), http://www.nytimes
.com/gwire/2010/09/24/24greenwire-obama-admin-steps-up-pressure-to-ratify-treati-73636
.html [https://perma.cc/5YNU-RYPA].
84. Cf. Schor, supra note 83 (describing how one State Department official “felt like
Oliver Twist” in attempting to participate in conversations in a treaty regime to which the
United States was not yet a party).
85. Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Law-
making in the United States, 117 Yale L.J. 1236, 1252–71, 1256 n.9 (2008) (examining the years
1980–2000 and documenting the widespread use of ex ante congressional-executive agree-
ments but finding evidence of only nine ex post congressional-executive agreements, most of
them trade agreements).
86. See generally id.
87. Id. at 1321.
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non-self-executing, the executive branch often tries hard to have the obliga-
tions in these treaties be ones that U.S. law already satisfies, thus removing
the need for implementing legislation.88 Especially in recent years, however,
the executive branch has been moving towards classifying such negotiated
agreements not as treaties that require two-thirds of the Senate, but rather as
agreements that the executive branch can enter into under its own authority
because there is no need for formal changes to U.S. domestic law. Thus, in
2013, the United States joined the Minamata Convention on Mercury with-
out the president ever seeking the advice and consent of the Senate.89 The
obligations set forth in the international agreement were ones that were cov-
ered by existing regulatory statutes—statutes which in turn delegated sub-
stantial regulatory authority to the EPA.90 The Obama Administration made
a similar move with respect to the recent Paris Agreement on climate.91
These developments have strong normative justifications.92 But they also
highlight that if the Senate wants its treaty power to remain relevant, it must
be open to ways to making the treaty process less cumbersome and more
predictable.
* * *
Both implementing legislation and administrative action such as
rulemaking can serve to translate legal directives into court-enforceable
mandates. Yet despite the surface parallels, these two processes are very dif-
ferent. The comparative ease of administrative rulemaking has helped usher
in the flourishing administrative state; it is almost impossible to imagine
modern American governance without it. By contrast, the difficulty of get-
ting congressional implementing legislation has helped to marginalize trea-
ties, in part decreasing U.S. engagement with international regulation and in
part channeling this engagement through other forms of international
agreements. Getting a law of the land to implement another law of the land
88. See, e.g., S. Exec. Rep. No. 109-18, at 6 (2006) (emphasizing the lack of need for
implementing legislation with respect to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption); Bellinger,
supra note 9, at 6 (“[W]henever we consider taking on new obligations, we examine a number
of factors . . . [including w]ill we be in a position to implement, or will there be complications
because of domestic law?”).
89. Tseming Yang, The Minamata Convention on Mercury and the Future of Multilateral
Environmental Agreements, 45 Envtl. L. Rep. 10064, 10071 (2015) (“Why was Senate advice
and consent skipped here? . . . [T]he answer can be found primarily in the determination by
the executive branch that the Minamata Convention’s provisions can be implemented without
new congressional legislation.”).
90. See generally United States Notification Regarding Measures to Implement the Mina-
mata Convention, Mercury Convention (Oct. 18, 2013), http://mercuryconvention.org/Por-
tals/11/documents/submissions/US%20declaration.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y36B-SD87]
(describing the regulatory framework, including many references to existing regulations
promulgated by federal agencies).
91. See Harold Hongju Koh, Triptych’s End: A Better Framework to Evaluate 21st Century
International Lawmaking, 126 Yale L.J. F. 338, 350–52 (2017).
92. See Jean Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Land-
scape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017) (on file with author).
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is a highly inefficient process. Before asking whether this should be, we
should ask how it came to be.
II. How Congress Came to Implement
Non-Self-Executing Treaties
The concept of non-self-executing treaties is now typically equated with
the need for congressional implementation. This equivalence long predates
Medelĺın. It flows naturally from conventional accounts of the rise of non-
self-executing treaties, which typically focus heavily on the 1829 Supreme
Court case of Foster v. Neilson93 and, to a lesser degree, on historical practice
related to congressional implementation of treaties. Yet practice and prece-
dent from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries offer several reasons
to question the assumption that non-self-executing treaties require imple-
menting legislation. One reason stems from how some treaties were admin-
istered and treated by the courts, including the Supreme Court. In these
cases, the judiciary accepted a flexible approach that allowed the executive
branch to serve as the intermediary responsible for translating treaty provi-
sions into court-enforceable obligations. A second reason comes from the
broader landscape of public law. The implementation of treaties and the rise
of the term “non-self-executing” (and its equivalent “not self-executing”) in
relation to them were not isolated questions. Rather, they were part of a
broader challenge of reconciling law and governance. Political actors and
courts were wrestling with the same kinds of questions—and using the
terms “self-executing” and “not self-executing”—with respect to the other
kinds of law listed in the Supremacy Clause: the Constitution and statutes.
In these contexts, Congress was not the sole actor deemed able to implement
non-self-executing provisions. Instead, the language, context, and purpose of
the provision at issue determined what actor could appropriately implement
the underlying law.
This Part explores both the conventional account of how Congress came
to be understood to be the actor responsible for implementing non-self-
executing treaties and the alternative narrative that supports a broader view
of treaty administration. It then considers how and why the conventional
account has come to be taken as fixed doctrine while the other narrative has
been almost entirely forgotten.
A. The Conventional Story
At the Constitutional Convention, the Framers chose to make treaties,
like statutes, the “supreme law of the land” and preemptive of state law. This
decision stemmed from a major foreign-affairs irritant during the era of the
Articles of Confederation—the failure of state courts to honor obligations
93. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32
U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
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incurred in the treaty of peace with Great Britain.94 The Supremacy Clause,
combined with the establishment of the federal court system, was intended
to ward off future problems of noncompliance with treaty obligations. As
Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 22, “The treaties of the United
States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the
land. Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all other
laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations.”95
Despite the recognized importance of complying with international ob-
ligations, the inclusion of treaties in the Supremacy Clause was controver-
sial, and debates during the Convention and the ratification process
foreshadowed two themes that would later find expression in practice and
precedent. The first of these themes was alarm about the exclusion of the
House of Representatives from the treaty-making process. Anti-Federalists
expressed concern that the Senate could “sell the whole Country by means
of Treaties”96 and proposed amendments to the Constitution included one
that would have required a supermajority of both Houses to approve certain
types of treaties.97 The second theme involved debate over the extent to
which, in making treaties the law of the land, the United States was diverging
from the practice of other countries, particularly Britain. This issue came up
in debates over the appropriateness of including treaties in the Supremacy
Clause,98 but it foreshadowed an issue about the international process of
treaty making. For if other countries do not make treaty commitments the
94. See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
932, 945, 995–1002 (2010). For legal scholarship exploring the Framers’ inclusion of treaties in
the Supremacy Clause and the reactions to this choice during the ratification debates, see, for
example, Martin S. Flaherty, Response, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Under-
standing, and Treaties as “Supreme Law of the Land”, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2095, 2120–51 (1999);
John T. Parry, Congress, the Supremacy Clause, and the Implementation of Treaties, 32 Ford-
ham Int’l L.J. 1209, 1222–64 (2009); and Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and
Remedies of Individuals, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1082, 1097–110 (1992).
95. The Federalist No. 22, at 150 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
96. 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 297 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) (statement of George Mason); see also Jack N. Rakove, Solving a Constitutional Puzzle:
The Treatymaking Clause as a Case Study, in 1 Perspectives in American History 233,
240–47 (Bernard Bailyn et al. eds., 1984) (discussing the origins of the Treaty Clause).
97. See 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the
Federal Constitution 660 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1901)
[hereinafter Elliot].
98. See, e.g., 4 Elliot, supra note 97, at 277–82 (South Carolina Convention); 2 The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 459–62, 466 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976) (Pennsylvania Convention); 10 The Documentary History of the Ratifi-
cation of the Constitution 1380–97 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993)
(Virginia Convention). These debates revealed considerable confusion over what the British
approach to treaty implementation entailed. In practice, the King (via his ministers) would
negotiate and ratify treaties, but in most cases Parliament would need to pass implementing
legislation before domestic courts would enforce these treaties. See Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 695, 697 n.12 (1995) (discuss-
ing the British approach).
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law of the land, then those treaties might need to be written in such a way as
to recognize the need for intermediate steps.
Early on, the practice of the political branches simultaneously embraced
the plain meaning of the Supremacy Clause and recognized that its language
did not resolve all questions related to the administration and enforcement
of treaties. The controversy that followed the ratification of the Jay Treaty in
1796 is an early and striking illustration. Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives argued that because this treaty with Great Britain was largely com-
mercial in nature and therefore overlapped with Congress’s commerce
power, congressional legislation would be needed to carry the treaty into
effect.99 President Washington firmly rebuffed this argument, observing that
“every treaty [made pursuant to the Treaty Clause] and promulgated thence-
forward became the law of the land.”100 Yet although the provisions of the
Jay Treaty were directly enforceable by domestic courts,101 legislation was
deemed necessary to appropriate the funds needed by the U.S. government
to implement the treaty.102 This need for separate legislation was not an
issue distinctive to treaties. As one representative remarked, “Treaties may
sometimes require Legislative aid to carry them into effect; so may laws, and
they were constantly in the habit of making laws to carry into effect laws
heretofore made.”103 But the experience of the Jay Treaty did make clear that
the implementation of treaties would sometimes require further action by
Congress.
In the Supreme Court as well, the meaning of treaties as the “supreme
law of the land” began to develop through precedent. In the same year as the
Jay Treaty debates, the Supreme Court in Ware v. Hylton interpreted the
Supremacy Clause as making a provision about debt repayment in the Treaty
of Peace with Great Britain enforceable in court and supreme over a con-
flicting state law.104 Yet just as acceptance of the Supremacy Clause in the
political branches took place against an undercurrent of concern for con-
gressional prerogatives, so did the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the
Supremacy Clause leave it nonetheless grappling with further questions.
99. For discussion, including of the resolution passed by the House to this effect, see
Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 94, at 1039–61.
100. Letter from George Washington, President, to the House of Representatives of the
United States (Mar. 30, 1796), in 1 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the
Presidents, 1789–1902, at 194, 195 (James D. Richardson ed., 1907).
101. Galbraith, supra note 81, at 86 n.97. For discussion of later practice relating to com-
mercial treaties, see id. at 88–93.
102. Act of May 6, 1796, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 459.
103. 5 Annals of Cong. 661 (1796) (statement of Rep. Hillhouse). The need for separate
appropriations legislation had constitutional underpinnings, since the Constitution specifies
that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations
made by Law.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 9.
104. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.). For analysis of the various
justices’ opinions, see Parry, supra note 94, at 1266–72, which notes that John Marshall, who
argued the case for the Virginian debtor, “did not even ask the Court to deny its ability to
enforce the treaty notwithstanding state law.”
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Ware contained hints of this,105 and the Supreme Court’s decision in Foster v.
Neilson in 1829 did so even more.106
In Foster, the Court considered whether a claimant was entitled to a land
grant in Florida based on a provision of the 1819 treaty between the United
States and Spain.107 The English version of the treaty provided that Spanish
land grants before a certain date “shall be ratified and confirmed . . . to the
same extent that the same grants would be valid if the territories had re-
mained under the dominion” of Spain.108 After quoting this provision, Chief
Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court continued as follows:
Do these words act directly on the grants . . . or do they pledge the faith of
the United States to pass acts which shall ratify and confirm them?
. . . .
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legisla-
tive act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished,
especially so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into exe-
cution by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.
. . . .
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitu-
tion declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, when-
ever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But
when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties
engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the Court.109
The Court went on to rule against the holder of the Spanish land grant.110 It
concluded that the language of this treaty—“shall be ratified”—was “the
language of contract; and if it is, the ratification and confirmation which are
promised must be the act of the legislature.”111
Foster gives treaty makers a green light to structuring treaty provisions
in ways that will not be immediately enforceable in court. Yet in another
way, it seems to tie their hands, for it suggests a binary choice between pro-
visions that are immediately enforceable in court and provisions that require
legislative enactment. This passage in Foster entirely overlooked the existence
of the executive branch, as shown by its use of the singular tense in speaking
105. Parry, supra note 96, at 1270–71 (discussing the Chase and Iredell opinions).
106. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), overruled in part by United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
107. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 256.
108. Id. at 314 (quoting Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and Limits, Spain-U.S., art. VIII,
Feb. 22, 1819, 8 Stat. 372).
109. Id. (emphasis added). This discussion is part of an alternative holding within Foster,
as Marshall’s opinion had previously stated that a majority of the Court thought the land at
issue was not covered by the treaty provision. Id. at 313.
110. Id. at 317 (affirming the district court’s dismissal of the petition filed by the holder of
the Spanish land grant).
111. Id. at 315.
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of “the political . . . department.”112 It thus did not consider whether there
could be treaty provisions that are not immediately enforceable in court but
that could be made so following action by the executive branch. This omis-
sion is dicta, since in Foster there were no intervening acts by either the
legislature or the executive branch that sought to execute the treaty in a way
that favored the holder of the Spanish land grant.113 Given Congress’s usual
role in legislating to quiet title,114 it is understandable that Foster focused
only on the legislative branch.
Although dicta, Foster’s pronouncements on this issue have proven im-
portant to forming the widespread assumption that Congress is the actor
charged with implementing non-self-executing treaties. Citing Foster, the
Supreme Court perpetuated this assumption in dicta in later cases.115 (Foster
itself did not use the terms “self-executing” or “not self-executing”; the
Court’s earliest use of this terminology with respect to treaties came in
1887.116) Indeed, various opinions simply define non-self-execution in terms
of legislative implementation: the Court’s 1888 opinion in Whitney v. Rob-
ertson, for example, explained in passing that when treaty “stipulations are
not self-executing[,] they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to
carry them into effect.”117 But before Medelĺın, this equivalence between
treaty provisions that are not immediately enforceable and the need for con-
gressional implementation was not important to the Court in practice. For
between Foster and Medelĺın, the Supreme Court almost never held a treaty
provision to be non-self-executing.118 Indeed, it even reversed Foster’s hold-
ing that the provision in the 1819 treaty required legislative implementation
before it could be enforced by a court.119
112. Id. at 314.
113. See id. at 282 (recognizing various acts of Congress contrary to the holder of the
Spanish land grant insofar as they “clearly recognise the interpretation, that the territory in
question was ceded to the United States by the treaty of Paris in 1803”).
114. See id. at 315–17 (discussing seven acts passed by Congress that deal with resolving
land grant issues in territory acquired through treaties).
115. E.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 288 (1902); Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 720–21 (1893); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 418 (1886); United
States v. Arredondo, 31 U.S. 691, 743 (1832).
116. Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887).
117. 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also, e.g., Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119
(1933) (“For in a strict sense the Treaty was self-executing, in that no legislation was necessary
to authorize executive action pursuant to its provisions.”).
118. The only apparent exception is Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S.
39, 49–50 (1913), which inferred, as an alternative holding, that a treaty provision was non-
self-executing. As with Foster, there was no attempted executive branch administration of this
treaty provision, other than the usual presidential proclamation of the treaty’s entry into force.
See generally id. Prior to Medelĺın, lower courts did at times find treaty provisions to be non-
self-executing, especially treaties involving human rights. See Hathaway et al., supra note 11, at
65–67.
119. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833) (quoting the translated
Spanish version and holding that the treaty provision might take effect “by force of the instru-
ment itself” rather than “stipulating for some future legislative act” in light of new evidence,
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Although the issue of treaty non-self-execution was mostly a nonissue
for the Supreme Court, the political branches came to be quite accustomed
to the use of implementing legislation for treaties. At times, the language of
treaties would expressly contemplate legislative implementation, consistent
with the green light given in Foster. An 1875 treaty with Hawaii, for example,
specified that it would not take effect “until a law to carry it into operation
shall have been passed by the Congress of the United States of America.”120
As another example, the Migratory Bird Treaty of 1916 provided that the
parties would “take, or propose to their respective appropriate law-making
bodies, the necessary measures for insuring the execution of the present
Convention.”121 This language was necessary for the other party to the
treaty—Great Britain—because of its constitutional approach to treaty im-
plementation.122 While the provision that the parties could simply “take” the
necessary measures might be read to suggest that the United States did not
in fact need implementing legislation, Congress nonetheless passed it.123
Such congressional practice supplemented and strengthened the equivalence
that developed between the concept of treaty non-self-execution and the
need for congressional implementation.
B. A Broader View of Treaty Administration
The account just given is the standard one about how our constitutional
tradition came to encompass non-self-executing treaties and to understand
such treaties to require congressional implementation. In what follows here,
I describe a quite different narrative—one which supports a broad, flexible
approach to treaty administration that is closely akin to statutory adminis-
tration. I focus in particular on two strands of this narrative: first, a long-
standing executive branch role in implementing certain regulatory treaties;
and, second, a recognition in the courts and political branches that the con-
cept of “not self-executing” provisions was an issue that encompassed not
only treaties, but also other forms of law. This other narrative has as strong
or perhaps an even stronger pedigree in nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century practice, but it is nonetheless almost entirely overlooked in current
understandings of treaty non-self-execution. It does not question the con-
cept of treaty non-self-execution, but it does undermine claims that such
non-self-execution involves a binary choice between legislative implementa-
tion and direct judicial enforceability. Instead, it suggests that the executive
branch can, in some cases, translate treaty provisions into court-enforceable
obligations.
not before the Court in Foster, that the Spanish version of the treaty provision in translation
provided that the land grants “shall remain ratified and confirmed”).
120. Convention on Commercial Reciprocity, Haw.-U.S., art. V, June 3, 1875, 19 Stat. 625.
121. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, U.K.-U.S., art. VIII, Aug. 16, 1916,
39 Stat. 1702.
122. See Vázquez, supra note 5, at 617.
123. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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1. Regulatory Implementation by the Executive Branch
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the executive branch
administered some regulatory treaties in ways that closely resemble how the
executive branch can administer statutes. In essence, the president or admin-
istrative agencies served as intermediaries between the courts and treaty pro-
visions that were not immediately enforceable.124 In other words, the
executive branch played the role that Chief Justice Marshall’s dicta had sug-
gested belonged to the legislative branch, and the courts validated this role.
This role for the executive branch was consistent with its broader role in
using executive powers, both prosecutorial and administrative, to influence
how courts enforced treaties.
The Jay Treaty gave rise to an early example of how executive branch
action might be needed before a court would enforce a treaty. In one of its
provisions, the United States and Great Britain each agreed to extradite fugi-
tives facing criminal charges in the other country.125 This provision was en-
forced against a man called Jonathan Robbins by executive branch actors in
the John Adams Administration, who successfully requested a federal judge
to authorize the extradition following a request by Great Britain.126 This ex-
ecutive branch request was essential to the court’s enforcement of the treaty
provision, as the judge “did not believe he could order foreign delivery of
[Robbins] under the Jay Treaty unless there had been a prior approval by the
President.”127 This incident set off a heated debate in the House of Repre-
sentatives over whether the extradition had been properly authorized in the
absence of implementing legislation.128 John Marshall (then a member of the
House) famously defended Adams’s authority, observing that the president
“is charged to execute the laws[ and a] treaty is declared to be a law.”129
124. I focus here only on the administration of treaties by the executive branch as it relates
to private actors. Other kinds of treaty administration by the executive branch are common
but unlikely to matter in the way that I focus on in this Article—i.e., they are unlikely to
translate treaty provisions into law that is enforceable in the courts. Thus, treaty provisions
commonly affect how the executive branch carries out its own business (e.g., interactions with
foreign nations). Treaty provisions might also affect how the executive branch treats non-
private individuals, such as members of the armed forces of another country. Justice Iredell
recognized this possibility in his opinion in Ware v. Hylton, where, in noting in dicta that some
treaty provisions might be executed by the president, he gave the example of a treaty authoriz-
ing an exchange of prisoners of war. 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 199, 273 (1796) (opinion of Iredell, J.); see
also Ex parte Toscano, 208 F. 938, 942–43 (S.D. Cal. 1913) (holding that the Hague Conven-
tion authorized the secretary of war, as an “officer of the executive department,” to detain
belligerents in the Mexican civil war who had come onto U.S. territory). Such activities impli-
cate not only power delegated to the president under the treaty, but also his or her com-
mander-in-chief authority.
125. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. XXVII, Nov. 19,
1794, 8 Stat. 116.
126. See Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale
L.J. 229, 287–93 (1990).
127. Id. at 288.
128. 10 Annals of Cong. 614 (1800).
129. Id. at 613.
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Marshall argued that “Congress, unquestionably, may prescribe the mode
[of implementing the treaty], and Congress may devolve on others the
whole execution of the contract; but, till this be done, it seems the duty of
the Executive department to execute the contract by any means it
possesses.”130
This incident showcases a quasi-prosecutorial role played by the execu-
tive branch in respect to treaties. Traditionally, treaties do not serve as crimi-
nal laws; instead, to the extent that they contemplate the criminalization of
certain conduct, they will typically do so by specifying a need for imple-
menting legislation. Indeed,
it has been assumed that an international agreement . . . requiring states
parties to punish certain actions . . . could not itself become part of the
criminal law of the United States, but would require Congress to enact an
appropriate statute before an individual could be tried or punished for the
offense.131
Nonetheless, with respect to some treaty provisions including but not lim-
ited to the extradition context,132 the executive branch has acted in ways that
have a prosecutorial character. During Prohibition, for example, the execu-
tive branch enforced the “liquor treaties” aimed at limiting the smuggling of
alcohol not only by seeking to stop the smugglers but also by criminally
prosecuting them—even where the smugglers had not otherwise committed
violations of U.S. law.133 Lower courts split over whether the executive
branch could directly enforce these treaties against private individuals in the
absence of congressional legislation.134
In this example, as in the extradition context, the role played by the
executive branch is prosecutorial rather than administrative. It is thus more
akin to bringing a cause of action than it is to administrative rulemaking or
adjudication. It is a role that the executive branch continues to play today
with respect to some treaties,135 and without more we might think that the
130. Id. at 614.
131. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 111 cmt. i (Am. Law Inst. 1987). But see Edwin D. Dickinson, Are the Liquor Treaties Self-
Executing?, 20 Am. J. Int’l L. 444, 450 (1926) (noting that “evidence in support of such histor-
ical traditions seems meager; and really authoritative constitutional interpretation is lacking”).
With regard to Indian treaties, for example, the Supreme Court recognized that preexisting
criminal legislation “could constitutionally be extended to embrace Indians in the Indian
country, by the mere force of a treaty.” Ex parte Kan-gi-Shun-ca, 109 U.S. 556, 567 (1883).
132. In 1848, Congress passed legislation specifying how extradition proceedings based on
treaty obligations would be carried out in the United States. This brought a practical end to
debate about whether extradition treaties require implementing legislation. See Galbraith,
supra note 81, at 103.
133. Dickinson, supra note 131, at 444–46; see also id. at 450 (discussing forfeiture cases
where the forfeitures were based solely on treaties and not on legislation).
134. Id. at 445–46.
135. A modern analogue can be found in Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, which are
typically bilateral treaties that provide that each country shall aid the other in criminal investi-
gations. The text of the MLAT between the United States and Canada, for example, specifies
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extent of executive branch action as an intermediary between treaty provi-
sions and court enforceability is limited to such prosecutorial roles. A close
look at history reveals, however, that the executive branch has also acted in
the past as a rulemaker and administrative adjudicator with respect to cer-
tain treaties, making regulatory decisions that give rise to or otherwise affect
the enforceability of these treaties in the courts.
The executive branch’s role in administering treaties is most evident in
the context of treaties with Indian tribes. These treaties predate 1871, when
the United States switched to relying exclusively on statutes,136 and they are
sometimes dismissed or overlooked by foreign relations law scholars.137 The
complex issues of sovereignty implicated by them, the coercive character of
their making, and their substance all may make scholars wary of engaging
with them. Yet they form an important part of the history of treaty making
and implementation. George Washington made a deliberate decision to treat
them as comparable to other treaties for purposes of the need to obtain the
Senate’s advice and consent,138 and the Supreme Court has consistently ac-
cepted them as similar to other treaties and as “the supreme law of the
land.”139 Moreover, because these treaties involved the regulation of conduct
on U.S. soil, they are a particularly significant source of evidence of early
constitutional practice with respect to treaty implementation, which would
often depend on further actions by the president or agency heads that were
specified in the treaties’ texts.
Consider, for example, the 1854 treaty between the United States and
the Chippewa Indians, in which the Chippewas ceded their land to the
United States and received in return various payments and land grants.140
Seven out of the twelve substantive articles of this treaty specifically en-
trusted the president with obligations or discretionary powers.141 Article 2
provided that the president would direct the fixing of boundaries of various
tracts of land. Article 3 gave sweeping discretionary authority to the
president:
The United States will define the boundaries of the reserved tracts [of land
for the Chippewas], whenever it may be necessary, by actual survey, and
the President may, from time to time, at his discretion, cause the whole to
be surveyed, and may assign to each head of a family or single person over
that the attorney general and his or her designees will execute Canadian requests for assistance
and that U.S. courts have jurisdiction to issue subpoenas and warrants that are needed to
execute these requests. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Can.-U.S., arts.
I, II, VII, Mar. 18, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-14 (1988).
136. See Indian Appropriations Act, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871).
137. Draft provisions of the treaty section of the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations
Law, for example, do not discuss them.
138. Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 Yale J. Int’l L. 247, 267 n.89
(2012).
139. E.g., In re N.Y. Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 768 (1866).
140. Treaty with the Chippewas, Chippewas-U.S., Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109.
141. Id. arts. 2–3, 5–7, 11–12.
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twenty-one years of age, eighty acres of land for his or their separate use;
and he may, at his discretion, as fast as the occupants become capable of
transacting their own affairs, issue patents therefor to such occupants, with
such restrictions of the power of alienation as he may see fit to impose.
And he may also, at his discretion, make rules and regulations, respecting
the disposition of the lands in case of the death of the head of a family, or
single person occupying the same, or in case of its abandonment by them.
And he may also assign other lands in exchange for mineral lands, if any
such are found in the tracts herein set apart. And he may also make such
changes in the boundaries of such reserved tracts or otherwise, as shall be
necessary to prevent interference with any vested rights.142
This language plainly confers power on the executive branch to administer
the treaty. Just as some treaties discussed earlier expressly contemplate legis-
lative implementation,143 so this treaty expressly contemplates executive
branch implementation. Indeed, this treaty sounds very much like a statute
that confers regulatory authority on the executive branch; it even specifies
that the president has the authority to make “rules and regulations” with
regard to certain issues.144
The treaty with the Chippewas was far from unique. As Greg Ablavsky
has observed, “Indian treaties—perhaps the paradigmatic instance of trea-
ties having domestic legislative effects” were regularly administered without
implementing legislation, other than appropriations.145 Indeed, the adminis-
tration of Indian treaties is sometimes treated as an important example of
nineteenth-century precursors to the twentieth-century administrative
state.146
The powerful regulatory role played by the executive branch in imple-
menting Indian treaties was accepted not only by the Senate in advising and
consenting to these treaties, but also by the judiciary in the course of their
enforcement. Lower court opinions accepted that the treaties conferred ad-
ministrative authority on the president and in some cases invoked adminis-
trative law principles of deference towards this authority. A 1903 D.C.
Circuit decision, for example, held not only that Article 3 of the Chippewa
treaty quoted above gave the president the authority to regulate the aliena-
tion of land grants, but also that where there was “serious controversy as to
142. Id. art. 3.
143. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
144. Later statutes relating to Indian tribes used very similar language. See, e.g., Dawes
Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, 389 (1887).
145. Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 Duke L.J. 999, 1080–81 (2014). Over
the nineteenth century, Congress did pass legislation that interacted in complex ways with
Indian treaties, but the executive branch nonetheless derived considerable administrative pow-
ers solely and directly from Indian treaties.
146. See generally Stephen J. Rockwell, Indian Affairs and the Administrative
State in the Nineteenth Century (2010).
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the meaning of the regulation,” it would give deference to “the interpreta-
tion placed by the [Department of the Interior] upon its own regulation, or
rather the regulation made by the President through the department.”147
The Supreme Court likewise deflected challenges to executive branch
administration of Indian treaties. In Holden v. Joy, the petitioner energeti-
cally disputed the validity and enforceability of various treaties involving
land transfers between the United States and the Cherokees. He argued,
among other things, that “[t]he Cherokee treaty could not constitutionally
impose the official duties, or confer the official powers on executive officers
necessary to execute it.”148 Interestingly, in disputing the authority of the
executive branch to execute the treaty, he expressly challenged the treaty on
the grounds that it “attempts to confer various powers on, and require du-
ties of, the Secretary of the Interior[ and] the Commissioner of the General
Land Office” even though these “officers are created by acts of Congress for
specific purposes and their powers are defined and limited.”149 The Court
ruled against the petitioner, noting the broad reach of the treaty power and
upholding the treaty provisions without expressing any doubt about either
their validity or the delegations they contained to executive branch
officials.150
Another even earlier Supreme Court case regarding Indian treaties, Doe
v. Wilson, provides an interesting counterpoint to Foster v. Neilson. The 1832
treaty between the United States and the Pottawatomie tribe had provided
that specific tribal members would retain title to certain lands covered in the
treaties, with these lands to “be selected under the direction of the President
of the United States, after the land shall have been surveyed, and the bound-
aries shall correspond with the public surveys,” and the members were to
receive patents for the land.151 The case turned on whether a tribal member
could sell his land before the survey took place and before the president
issued the patents.152 The attorney arguing against alienation claimed that
the treaty provision “was a mere executory promise of the United States . . .
147. Hitchcock v. United States ex rel. Bigboy, 22 App. D.C. 275, 287 (D.C. Cir. 1903); see
also Starr v. Campbell, 208 U.S. 527, 533–35 (1908) (discussing regulations made by the presi-
dent in 1893 stemming from Article 3 without expressing any doubt as to the president’s
authority to make these regulations); Tomkins v. Campbell, 108 N.W. 216, 217 (Wisc. 1906)
(reaching the same conclusion in a similar case); cf. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 355–57 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that earlier treaties
with the Chippewas that gave the president power to terminate their hunting and fishing rights
implicitly required the president to exercise this right only if the Chippewas mistreated white
settlers).
148. Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 225 (1872).
149. Id. (further claiming that the “treaty power cannot usurp legislative power or inter-
rupt and prevent the performance of duties imposed by the latter power on officers whose
offices are established by law”).
150. See id. at 242–43, 246–52.
151. Doe v. Wilson, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 457, 462 (1859) (quoting the treaty).
152. See id. at 462–63.
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[that] was to be performed by the political department, and before its per-
formance could create no inchoate title.”153 Here, as in Foster, the argument
was that the treaty provision was executory and had to be performed by the
political department.154 But, unlike in Foster, the political department re-
ferred to was not the legislative branch but rather the president.155 The
Court concluded that the tribal member’s right to the land was sufficiently
vested at the time of the treaty to be alienable; the Court therefore did not
reach a holding as to whether treaty provisions could be made enforceable
only following presidential action.156 It did not express any concern with the
delegation of authority to the president in this treaty, however, and indeed
observed that the land transfer itself took effect only “when the United
States selected the lands reserved to him.”157
The administration of the Indian treaties thus suggests continuity be-
tween treaties and statutes. The Supreme Court similarly signaled its sup-
port for such continuity in a case arising from an 1894 treaty with China
that, as with other treaties and legislation from the time, sought to minimize
Chinese emigration to the United States.158 The treaty provided that
Chinese laborers shall continue to enjoy the privilege of transit across the
territory of the United States in the course of their journey to or from
other countries, subject to such regulations by the Government of the United
States as may be necessary to prevent said privilege of transit from being
abused.159
In the “almost entirely overlooked” case of Fok Yung Yo v. United States,160
the Court considered a claim by a Chinese citizen that the treaty entitled
him to entry in the United States, where Department of the Treasury regula-
tions stipulated that entry for transit required that the applicant could “sat-
isfy the [customs official] that a bona fide transit only is intended.”161
153. Id. at 460.
154. Id.; Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled in part by United
States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
155. Wilson, 64 U.S. (23 How.) at 460; Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
156. Wilson, 64 U.S. (23 How.) at 463–64.
157. Id. at 464.
158. For discussion of anti-Chinese legislation from the time, as well as other treaties and
Supreme Court cases addressing Chinese exclusion issues, see generally Sarah H. Cleveland,
Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins
of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 112–50 (2002).
159. Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 301 (1902) (emphasis added) (quoting
Immigration Convention, China-U.S., art. III, Mar. 17, 1894, 28 Stat. 1210).
160. Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 1901–1945, in International
Law in the U.S. Supreme Court: Continuity and Change 191, 197 (David L. Sloss et al.
eds., 2011).
161. 185 U.S. at 301–02. The regulations stated that a through ticket to the foreign desti-
nation needed to be produced. Fok Yung Yo, 185 U.S. at 301–02. The petitioner produced such
a ticket, but the Court interpreted the through ticket requirement in the regulation to be
necessary but not sufficient to satisfy the regulatory standard. See id. at 304–05.
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The petitioner argued that the executive branch could not issue regula-
tions to administer this treaty:
We insist that these regulations are not governmental regulations, or regu-
lations by the Government of the United States, in the sense in which those
words are used in the treaty. A governmental regulation is a regulation
authorized by Congress, and the mere rule of an executive officer of the
Government, which he is not authorized by Congress to make, does not
come within the meaning of the term. In other words, before the regula-
tion of the Secretary of the Treasury, in regard to the transit of Chinese
laborers across the territory of the United States, can become a governmen-
tal regulation, the Secretary of the Treasury must be authorized and di-
rected to make it, by an Act of Congress.162
The petitioner lost. The Court held that treaty authorized the regula-
tions, as “[i]t dealt with the subject specifically, and was operative without
an act of Congress to carry it into effect.”163 Thus, the treaty “manifestly
operate[s] to commit the subject of transit to executive regulation and deter-
mination,” and the government prevailed in the case.164 The Court reached
this holding even though, unlike the Indian treaties discussed above, the
treaty with China did not specify what actors were to issue the “regulations
by the Government of the United States.”165 The Court thus accepted that
the word “regulation” in the treaty authorized rulemaking action by the ex-
ecutive branch as opposed to requiring congressional implementation.166
Fok Yung Yo in some sense turns the traditional self-execution analysis
on its head. The treaty provision at issue was self-executing in the sense that
it did not require congressional legislation, and yet the Chinese petitioner
could not take advantage of this provision in the courts because of the inter-
vening treaty-authorized regulation. This point is a piece of a bigger picture:
as with the Indian treaties discussed earlier, the Court approached the treaty
in a way similar to how it would approach a statute. As a lower court from
around this time observed in dicta:
An examination of the decisions of the Supreme Court on this topic will
show there is no practical distinction whatever as betwen [sic] a statute and
a treaty with regard to its becoming presently effective, without awaiting
further legislation. A statute may be so framed as to make it apparent that
it does not become practically effective until something further is done,
either by Congress itself or by some officer or commission intrusted [sic]
162. Brief of Appellant at 15, Fok Yung Yo, 185 U.S. 296 (No. 478) (on file with author).
163. Fok Yung Yo, 185 U.S. at 303. Prior to the treaty, the executive branch had issued
similar regulations. Id. at 299–300. The Court did not address whether these regulations were
authorized by independent executive power or by a prior statute, instead basing its holding
squarely on the authorization it concluded was contained in the treaty. See id. (noting, among
other things, that “it may be doubtful” that a prior statutory provision on the issue “ever took
effect”).
164. Id. at 305; see also In re Lee Gon Yung, 111 F. 998, 1001–02 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1901)
(reaching a similar holding).
165. Fok Yung Yo, 185 U.S. at 303, 305.
166. Id. at 305.
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with certain powers with reference thereto. The same may be said with
regard to a treaty.167
Consistent with the broader narrative described here, this language envisions
statutes and treaties as having the same tool kit available for implementa-
tion, with the choice of tool depending on what the statute or treaty speci-
fies. This parallel between treaties and statutes is also suggested by another
strand of evidence, to which this Article now turns: the use of the terms
“self-executing” and “not self-executing” in reference to laws other than
treaties.
2. Non-Self-Execution for All Kinds of Laws of the Land
The distinction between “self-executing” and “not self-executing” provi-
sions is often treated as an issue specific to treaties. But it is not. Around the
same time that the Supreme Court and the political branches began using
these terms with respect to treaties, they also began using them in relation to
the two other types of the law of the land—the Constitution and statutes.
These uses suggest that the language of self-execution and non-self-execu-
tion was not initially a matter of treaty exceptionalism, but rather terminol-
ogy directed to a broader issue of governance.168 That issue is how to
reconcile the dictates of the Supremacy Clause with the reality that some
textual provisions seem to expressly contemplate intervening action, typi-
cally by the political branches, before they can be enforceable in the
courts.169 The Supreme Court and political actors used the terms “self-exe-
cuting” and “not self-executing” in many different ways, including some that
came to refer to implementation by the executive branch rather than
Congress.
It was in the 1870s and 1880s that the terms “self-executing” and “not
self-executing” came into the vocabulary of the Supreme Court. In 1875, the
Court remarked in dicta that a particular statute “was self-executing, requir-
ing no aid from legislation, either State or National.”170 In 1883, the Court
described the Thirteenth Amendment as “undoubtedly self-executing
167. United Shoe Mach. Co. v. Duplessis Shoe Mach. Co., 155 F. 842, 845 (1st Cir. 1907).
168. My purpose in what follows is to highlight similarities, not to claim perfect parity.
There are of course differences. Because a treaty is also a contract, the concept of non-self-
execution is often tied to the idea of executory contractual provisions in a way that is rarely the
case with respect to statutes. In addition, the use of the language of self-execution and non-
self-execution in the statutory context has largely been supplanted by the vocabulary of admin-
istrative law.
169. I focus here only on the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes, but the concept of
non-self-executing and self-executing provisions is also found in other public law contexts as
well, such as state constitutions. See, e.g., Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582, 596
(1946) (“There is, in the first place, some question whether this new provision of Florida’s
constitution is self-executing or requires legislation for its enforcement.” (footnote omitted)).
170. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 255 (1875).
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without any ancillary legislation.”171 In 1885, it described the Extradition
Clause of the Constitution as “not, in its nature, self executing” and instead
requiring congressional implementation.172 In 1887, the Court first used this
terminology with respect to treaties, observing that certain provisions would
be inapplicable “even if conceded to be self-executing.”173 In 1888, the Court
stated in dicta that “not self-executing” treaty provisions require implement-
ing legislation.174
These early uses of “self-executing” and “not self-executing” have both a
substantive and procedural component. Substantively, they recognize that
some provisions of the Constitution, statutes, and treaties will not be imme-
diately enforceable. Procedurally, they seem to assume that legislation will
be needed to make them enforceable. In the treaty context, it was not until
Medelĺın that the Supreme Court was really invited to look hard at these two
components and decide if they necessarily went together.175 In the constitu-
tional and especially the statutory context, however, the Supreme Court has
come to treat the substantive rather than the procedural component of “not
self-executing” as its core. This is shown by its use of “self-executing” and
“not self-executing” to refer to provisions that require further intermediary
action before their enforcement in court, even where this further action
would be undertaken by actors other than a legislature.
In constitutional discourse, when the Supreme Court mentions “not
self-executing” provisions, it usually is referring to provisions that need to
be implemented by Congress. This is because the text, structure, or purpose
of the constitutional provisions at issue require Congress to be the imple-
menter.176 Examples include the establishment and jurisdictional reach of
171. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (adding, however, that “legislation may
be necessary and proper . . . to prescribe proper modes of redress for its violation in letter or
spirit”).
172. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 94 (1885). For another early example in the constitu-
tional context, see In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 81–82 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting), which used
the term “self-executing” to refer to constitutional powers that are “independent of statute.”
173. Bartram v. Robertson, 122 U.S. 116, 120 (1887).
174. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
175. See Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 525–26 (2008).
176. An interesting point of comparison is the Commerce Clause. It is held to have a self-
executing component—the dormant commerce clause—even though its text reads simply like
a grant of power to Congress. E.g., S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87
(1984) (“Although the Commerce Clause is by its text an affirmative grant of power to Con-
gress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the Clause has long been recognized as a
self-executing limitation on the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens
on such commerce.”); see also Obstruction to Navigation, 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 404, 405 (1886)
(noting the “self-executing commercial power of the Constitution”).
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the lower federal courts177 and the Extradition Clause.178 Statements by
actors in the political branches similarly use the language of non-self-execu-
tion in connection with legislation.179 But there are other instances in which
the Court has described a constitutional provision as “not self-executing”
without deeming Congress to be the actor charged with implementing the
provision. In the Fifth Amendment context, the Court has repeatedly de-
scribed its protection against self-incrimination as typically “not self-execut-
ing” but instead requiring individuals to affirmatively invoke its
protections.180 This suggests that in the constitutional context, the idea of
self-executing and non-self-executing provisions is not rigidly tied to Con-
gress as the implementer.
In the statutory context, the Court has come even more clearly to dis-
tance the terminology of non-self-execution from the process of congres-
sional implementation. The Court now sometimes uses the term “not self-
executing” to refer to a statutory provision that needs to be implemented by
the executive branch, often through an administrative process. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the Court began doing this during the New Deal era. Adminis-
trative activity by the executive branch goes back to the very beginning of
constitutional history, and indeed in the Congressional Record the terms “not
self-executing” and “self-executing” are used at least on rare occasion with
177. The text of Article III makes the establishment of lower courts take effect only upon
congressional action. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall
be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.” (emphasis added)). Their jurisdiction is similarly deemed to re-
quire congressional action. E.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807
(1986) (“Article III of the Constitution gives the federal courts power to hear cases ‘arising
under’ federal statutes. That grant of power, however, is not self-executing, and it was not until
the Judiciary Act of 1875 that Congress gave the federal courts general federal-question juris-
diction.” (footnote omitted)); cf. California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 65 (1979) (observing that
the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under the Constitution “is self-executing, and needs
no legislative implementation”).
178. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 94 (1885) (deriving Congress’s role as the implementer
not from the text of Article IV but rather from the need for uniform rather than state-by-state
procedures).
179. For a few examples, see 45 Cong. Rec. 4,214 (1910) (statement of Sen. Crawford)
(“It requires an act of Congress to give these inferior federal courts any jurisdiction. This part
of the Constitution is not self-executing.”), and 8 Cong. Rec. 160 (1879) (statement of Sen.
Bayard) (“[I]s not the Constitution filled with powers some of which are self-executing, and
some of which are called non-self-executing, which require the legislative power of Congress to
make provision for their exercise?”).
180. E.g., Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429, 434 (1984); Roberts v. United States,
445 U.S. 552, 559 (1980) (“The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion is not self-executing . . . [and in certain circumstances] may not be relied upon unless it is
invoked in a timely fashion.”). Another example of a non-self-executing constitutional provi-
sion is the Eighteenth Amendment establishing Prohibition. That provision gave enforcement
power to “[t]he Congress and the several States.” U.S. Const. amend. XVIII, § 2 (emphasis
added), repealed by U.S. Const. amend. XXI; 72 Cong. Rec. 1,168 (1930) (statement of Sen.
Blease) (describing the Eighteenth Amendment as “not self-executing” in that it “does not
provide any means for enforcement or attach any penalty for violation” other than as set forth
in legislation by Congress or the states).
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respect to executive branch administration of statutes as far back as the
1870s.181 Yet as Jerry Mashaw has observed, “[N]ineteenth-century adminis-
trative law [has] remained invisible to us” largely because it took place
outside the courts.182 With increased court scrutiny of administrative law
from the New Deal onward, the Court had more reason to consider how the
executive branch can serve as the intermediary between a statute and the
courts.
United States v. Sponenbarger is a helpful example.183 In the course of
that case, which addressed whether a flood control statute amounted to a
taking under the Fifth Amendment, the Court spoke twice of non-self-exe-
cuting provisions. Once, it remarked on “when legislation does not consti-
tute self-executing appropriation,” implying that, in these circumstances,
much would depend on “future decisions of Congress.”184 But while this use
of the language of non-self-execution invoked the need for further congres-
sional administration, another use was directed to the need for future execu-
tive branch administration.185 As part of her argument, the plaintiff had
asserted that a provision of the statute preempted certain state laws that were
protecting her property from flooding.186 The Court rejected this argument,
stating that the statute “does not represent a self-executing assumption of
complete control over all levees to the exclusion of the States and local au-
thorities.”187 Instead, the Court found that the statute itself specified inter-
mediate steps that would have to occur before the statute preempted state
law and further noted that “the War Department, charged with its adminis-
tration, has treated the Act as leaving local interests free” to continue to
regulate.188
Sponenbarger’s dual uses suggest that the language of non-self-execution
is not necessarily linked to congressional administration, but rather more
generally to the need for further administration by the appropriate actor.
This approach has been taken by the Court in other cases as well, ranging
181. E.g., 79 Cong. Rec. 8,538 (1935) (statement of Rep. Connery) (“Section 7(a) was not
self-executing . . . [Rather, employers] became subject to a code of fair competition approved
by the President . . .”); 67 Cong. Rec. 11,875 (1926) (statement of Sen. Norris) (“This law is
not self-executing. . . . It requires the action of this board . . . .”); 33 Cong. Rec. 828 (1900)
(statement of Rep. Jenkins) (“The statute of 1887 is not self-executing, but makes it the duty of
the Attorney-General to proceed against such property to enforce forfeiture.”); 9 Cong. Rec.
941 (1879) (statement of Rep. Springer) (“A law may be self-executing, or such that its opera-
tion does not require personal agents to carry it into effect . . . . Or a law may require agents or
officials to enforce it, as for example regulations as to the registration of voters.”).
182. Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age,
119 Yale L.J. 1362, 1367 (2010).
183. 308 U.S. 256 (1939).
184. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. at 268, 268 n.15.
185. Id. at 268, 269 (stating that “the Act naturally left much to the discretion of its
administrators” in the War Department).
186. Id. at 268.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 269 (noting that the preemptive provision should not take effect unless, pursu-
ant to the terms of the statute, the United States built or acquired its own levees).
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from the New Deal era to the present day.189 Such uses are not frequent, as
the language of administrative law provides the Court with many other ways
to say that an administrative agency must implement a statute. They none-
theless show that the term “not self-executing” need not be equated with
congressional implementation.
Overall, the Court’s use of the terms “self-executing” and “not self-exe-
cuting” outside the treaty context have revealed a certain fluidity. These uses
are knit together only at a high level of generality by the concept that some
intermediary actor must do something before a court can act. The terms are
not immutable but instead have shifted in response to changing times and
changing practices of governance. As in the treaty context,190 they remain
confusing terms, and we should probably be thankful that it is only in that
context that they have become prevalent. But their use in these other con-
texts suggests that we should be wary of assuming that the meanings of these
terms had to be fixed by their first uses or that these uses were meant to
drive a wedge between treaties and other forms of the law of the land. In-
stead, as with the ways in which the executive branch did translate treaty
provisions into court-enforceable obligations, the use of these terms across
contexts suggests continuity between treaties and statutes.
C. The Past Half-Obscured
The past’s role as prologue depends on what we understand the past to
be. The account above offers two sketches of the past. The first conceptual-
izes treaty implementation in our domestic legal system as a matter for
189. E.g., EC Term of Years Tr. v. United States, 550 U.S. 429, 430–31 (2007) (“ ‘A federal
tax lien, however, is not self-executing,’ and the IRS must take ‘[a]ffirmative action . . . to
enforce collection of the unpaid taxes.’ ” (quoting United States v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce,
472 U.S. 713, 720 (1985)); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 64 (1974) (“[T]he statute
is not self-executing, and were the Secretary to take no action whatever under his authority
there would be no possibility of criminal or civil sanctions being imposed on anyone . . . .”);
Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 92 (1957) (“[W]e do not suggest that the
National Transportation Policy is a set of self-executing principles that inevitably point the way
to a clear result in each case. On the contrary, those principles overlap and may conflict, and,
where this occurs, resolution is the task of the agency that is expert in the field.”); Columbia
Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 418 (1942) (“Most rules of conduct having the force
of law are not self-executing but require judicial or administrative action to impose their sanc-
tions with respect to particular individuals.”); FCC v. Pottsville Broad. Co., 309 U.S. 134, 142
(1940) (“Modern administrative tribunals . . . . have been a response to the felt need of gov-
ernmental supervision over economic enterprise—a supervision which could effectively be
exercised neither directly through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial process.”). For
usage in the executive branch, see, for example, Attorney General Francis Biddle’s advisory
opinion on the pooling of traffic by carriers, which describes how one section of an act “is self-
executing and becomes immediately operative without aid of powers conferred upon the Com-
mission” while another section “is executed by the Commission in the exercise of emergency
powers.” Pooling of Traffic by Carriers, 40 Op. Att’y Gen. 162, 166 (1949).
190. See generally David L. Sloss, The Death of Treaty Supremacy: An Invisible
Constitutional Change 295–318 (2016) (describing a range of ways in which treaty self-
execution has been conceptualized); Vázquez, supra note 98 (discussing multiple possible
meanings of self-execution in the treaty context).
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either Congress or the courts. Its exclusion of the executive branch stems
partly from concern about congressional prerogatives, but also—and heav-
ily—from omissions in dicta that occurred at a time when the administra-
tive capacities of the executive branch were comparatively undeveloped. The
second sketch suggests that treaty implementation was like statutory imple-
mentation. In both cases, the practical needs of governance made interven-
ing administration sometimes necessary. Whether Congress or the executive
branch filled this intervening role turned on the interpretation of the treaty
or statute in conjunction with background assumptions about the separa-
tion of powers.
Yet of these two sketches, the former dominates our contemporary un-
derstanding of treaty implementation, while the latter is forgotten or at best
given cursory attention. Foster v. Neilson receives endless attention as the key
case to understanding how treaties are or are not directly enforceable in
courts as the law of the land, while cases like Holden v. Joy, Doe v. Wilson,
and Fok Yung Yo v. United States barely receive mention.191 The equation of
non-self-executing treaties with the need for congressional implementation
is so strong that it is sometimes taken as a matter of definition. As a leading
scholar in the field writes, “At a general level, a self-executing treaty may be
defined as a treaty that may be enforced in the courts without prior legisla-
tion by Congress, and a non-self-executing treaty, conversely, as a treaty that
may not be enforced in the courts without prior legislative
‘implementation.’ ”192
This is not to say that foreign relations law scholars fail to recognize the
possibility that the executive branch could implement treaties in ways that
effect their judicial enforceability. To the contrary, most careful scholars on
treaty self-execution recognize that the terms “self-executing” and “non-self-
executing” may encompass multiple meanings and acknowledge the concep-
tual possibility of the executive branch serving as the intermediary. The at-
tention given to this possibility, however, is often very brief, especially in the
pre-Medelĺın literature.193 The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,
for example, defines a non-self-executing treaty as a treaty that requires
implementing legislation in its black letter section,194 leaving it to the
191. For examples of scholarship giving substantial attention to Foster but not the other
cases, see Henkin, supra note 75, at 197–204; Bradley, supra note 11, at 132–39; Sloss, supra
note 11, at 143–62; and Vázquez, supra note 5, at 628–44.
192. Vázquez, supra note 98, at 695.
193. See e.g., Henkin, supra note 75, at 203; David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing Treaties: Ex-
posing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 23–24 (2002); Vázquez, supra note 98,
at 707. Notable pre-Medelĺın exceptions include Swaine, supra note 12, at, 353–59, which de-
votes several pages to the prospect of executive branch implementation of non-self-executing
treaties, although not specifically considering regulatory treaties or their parallels to statutes),
and Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA
L. Rev. 309, 356–61, 366 (2006), which considers the possibility of executive branch adminis-
tration of treaties but defending the binary approach to treaty implementation that has been
derived from Foster.
194. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 111(4) (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
June 2017] Making Treaty Implementation 1347
comments to note in passing that “the intention of the United States deter-
mines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States or
should await implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or ad-
ministrative action.”195
What explains why Foster’s narrative of Congress or the courts has dom-
inated over the alternative narrative recognizing that the executive branch
can serve as the intermediary? There is undoubtedly no single answer, but at
least four complementary possibilities merit consideration. First, for much
of the twentieth century, regulatory treaties that needed implementing ac-
tion were not too common, and for these treaties the practice of the political
branches relied on congressional implementation. Where administrative im-
plementation of statutes blossomed, rooted in the necessity of governance,
the need for regulatory implementation of treaties dwindled between the
time of Indian treaties and the post–Cold War era. Less tied by partisan
gridlock than today,196 Congress could act when needed, and courts and
scholars largely overlooked the earlier practice of executive branch imple-
mentation of regulatory treaties. Second, in the post–World War II era, a
great debate arose over whether the United States should join human rights
treaties and, if so, how they should be implemented. Opponents of these
treaties pushed for a constitutional amendment that would have required all
treaties to have congressional implementation in order to take effect as do-
mestic law.197 Although their efforts were unsuccessful, this debate rein-
forced a focus on congressional implementation, as opposed to other kinds
of implementation. Third, the narrative based on Foster may reflect a
privileging of Chief Justice Marshall and of international treaties with Euro-
pean powers over cases involving less-known justices and treaties with the
Indian tribes and China. This is particularly understandable given the poli-
cies promoted by the latter treaties.198 Fourth and finally, the idea of execu-
tive branch administration of regulatory treaties is most easily understood
by ways of parallels to administrative law. Yet foreign relations law scholar-
ship more naturally thinks of executive branch authority in terms of consti-
tutional foreign-affairs powers rather than domestic administrative
delegations.
195. Id. § 111 cmt. h (emphasis added); see also id. § 111 reporters’ note 5 (also hinting
briefly at the prospect of executive implementation).
196. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 Va. L. Rev.
953, 958 (2016) (describing how the rise of partisan polarization in the last half century has
affected Congress).
197. Louis Henkin, Editorial Comment, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions:
The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 341, 348–49 (1995) (describing these efforts,
which were led by Senator Bricker of Ohio, and noting the continuing shadow they have cast
on practice in relation to treaty implementation, especially for human rights treaties).
198. Unsurprisingly, the most invoked aspect of the alternative narrative given above is
the extradition of Jonathan Robbins, which took place not long after the Founding and in-
volved a European treaty. See, e.g., Parry, supra note 94, at 1295–1303; Sloss, supra note 11, at
146–48; Wedgwood, supra note 126.
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Both the briefing and the Court’s opinion in Medelĺın demonstrated
how little the alternative narrative described above was considered in that
case. In arguing that the president could implement the ICJ’s decision, the
brief for Medellı́n noted the Jonathan Robbins extradition but focused pri-
marily on the president’s general foreign-affairs powers.199 The brief for the
United States in support of Medellı́n similarly rested almost exclusively on
the president’s foreign-affairs powers.200 Neither brief cited Fok Yung Yo or
discussed the president’s power to implement Indian treaties, and any paral-
lels they drew to statutory implementation focused mostly on constitutional
law rather than administrative law.201 The Court’s opinion followed suit. It
quoted Foster six times202 but neither explored potential parallels between
treaty implementation and administrative law nor discussed the ways in
which the president has historically acted to implement treaties.
Since Medelĺın, some scholars have taken up whether the president can
act to make judicially enforceable treaty provisions that otherwise would not
be. Paul Stephan argues that treaties, like laws, should be able to “have no
immediate effect but can authorize the Executive, without any further legis-
lation, to adopt rules that do have direct domestic effect.”203 David Sloss
similarly argues that the executive branch should be able to implement exec-
utory treaty provisions where U.S. separation-of-powers principles make it
the appropriate actor for doing so.204 In contrast, Ernest Young expresses
skepticism over whether treaties might give domestic implementing author-
ity to the president, especially where the exercise of this authority would
seek to preempt state law.205 Each of these scholars goes well beyond the
ground covered in the Court’s opinion in Medelĺın. Stephan and Young en-
gage at least briefly with administrative law analogies that are lacking in
Medelĺın,206 and Sloss argues for a very different reading of Foster and other
199. See Brief for Petitioner at 30, Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (No. 06-984)
(discussing the Robbins extradition); id. at 34–42 (discussing the president’s foreign-affairs
powers, particularly with regard to claim settlement).
200. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Medelĺın, 552
U.S. 491 (No. 06-984); see also Brief of Former U.S. Diplomats as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 5–13, Medelĺın, 552 U.S. 491 (No. 06-984) (focusing heavily on the president’s
authority to settle claims with foreign nations).
201. Brief for the United States, supra note 200, at 9–10 (relying on Justice Jackson’s
Youngstown framework); Brief for Petitioner, supra note 199, at 34–36 (same). This brief did
state that a “treaty requirement, just like a constitutional or statutory requirement, may call for
legislative, executive, or judicial action.” Brief for the United States, supra note 200, at 31.
202. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 505, 508, 514, 516, 526.
203. Stephan, supra note 12, at 24.
204. Sloss, supra note 11; see also Steve Charnovitz, Revitalizing the U.S. Compliance
Power, 102 Am. J. Int’l L. 551, 551–59 (2008) (suggesting that Medelĺın got it wrong and
should have held that the president had authority to implement the ICJ judgment).
205. Young, supra note 11, at 130–31.
206. Stephan, supra note 12, at 31 (“Chevron suggests that courts should give substantial
deference to the President’s interpretation of the Charter and the Protocol as containing an
implicit delegation of discretion to implement ICJ judgments.”); Young, supra note 11, at
103–07 (discussing forms of deference in administrative law as they relate to treaties).
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precedents in the conventional narrative than was taken by the Court.207 Yet
the work of these scholars focuses more on claims settlement issues than on
administrative regulation and overlooks almost all of the alternative narra-
tive described above. Recovering the historical connections between the im-
plementation of treaties and the administration of statutes enables a more
comprehensive evaluation of what can and should be done in the future.
III. Implementing Treaties Through Administrative Action
Why not administer treaties more like statutes? Right now, the adminis-
tration of many treaties, especially regulatory multilateral treaties, is as-
sumed to require implementing legislation.208 This makes it harder for the
United States to join these treaties and increases the incentives for the execu-
tive branch to pursue global cooperation through means other than treaties.
Moving to a system where the executive branch could administer regulatory
treaties directly would in effect catch treaties up to a place that statutes
reached long ago. This Part assesses the extent to which such a move would
be constitutionally permissible, whether it would be desirable, and how it
might be obtained. It also briefly considers how administrative law princi-
ples could be adapted to the treaty context.
A. Constitutional Permissibility
Before Medelĺın, executive branch administration of regulatory treaties
would have been an easy constitutional issue. Given the parallel treatment of
treaties and statutes in the Supremacy Clause, if the executive branch can
translate statutory directives into court-enforceable obligations, then it
should be able to do the same with regard to treaties in the absence of
strong, constitutionally grounded reasons otherwise. Before Medelĺın, such
contrary grounds either did not exist or set only modest constraints. A
broad reading of Medelĺın would rule out executive branch administration of
regulatory statutes, but such a reading is inconsistent with the internal logic
of Medelĺın and unpersuasive, particularly read against a backdrop of other
Supreme Court precedents. Instead, I argue that Medelĺın does not under-
mine the constitutionality of the executive branch’s ability to serve as the
regulatory intermediary between treaty provisions and court-enforceable
obligations, although it does set limits on when the delegated power to fulfill
this role can be inferred.
The text of the Constitution supports the executive branch’s authority
to implement treaties through administrative processes just as much—and
possibly more—as it does the executive branch’s authority to implement
statutes through these processes. Both treaties and statutes are the “supreme
207. Sloss, supra note 11.
208. See generally supra Part II.
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Law of the Land,209 and given that the Supremacy Clause can apply to ad-
ministrative action taken pursuant to statutory authority,210 it should logi-
cally be able to do the same with respect to similar actions taken pursuant to
treaty authority. Indeed, delegations to the executive branch as a textual
matter may be easier for treaties than for statutes. Congress’s now well-es-
tablished authority to delegate rulemaking authority is somewhat in tension
with the text of the Article I Vesting Clause, which specifies that “[a]ll legis-
lative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.”211 By contrast, treaty-based delegations to the executive branch
would remain entirely within Article II, which contains not only the Treaty
Clause but also the Executive Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause.212
These latter two clauses give rise to the president’s power to execute the laws
and thereby relate to his or her ability to wield delegated authority. The Take
Care Clause provides that the president shall “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed,” and both practice and precedents solidly support the
conclusion that this reference to the “Laws” encompasses treaties.213
In addition to text, the account given earlier of historical practice and
precedents suggest that the implementation of treaty provisions that are not
immediately enforceable in court need not be exclusively done by Congress.
Such implementation of course may lie with Congress, and historically it has
usually done so. But the historical practice discussed earlier with respect to
Indian treaties and some treaties with foreign sovereigns, in combination
with the Supreme Court’s acceptance of this practice, supports the conclu-
sion that the executive branch can be a constitutionally permissible interme-
diary between the courts and treaty provisions that are not directly
enforceable.
Expressing wariness at the prospect of executive branch implementation
of treaties, Ernest Young observes that statutory “[d]elegations to agencies
have been accepted in our legal culture primarily because both the courts
and Congress retain significant control over the exercise of delegated author-
ity.”214 He questions “whether these checks [would] operate in an equally
effective way for treaty delegations.”215 This concern is important, both as a
209. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
210. See supra Section I.B.
211. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1. For reconciliation of this text with the practice of administra-
tive law, see, for example, Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
212. See U.S. Const. art. II.
213. Id. art. II, § 3; see Swaine, supra note 12, at 342–48. In Medelĺın, the Court tersely
rejected an argument made by Medellı́n with regard to the Take Care Clause but did so with-
out addressing whether the word “Laws” in the Take Care Clause applies to treaties. See 552
U.S. 491, 532 (2008) (stating that the ICJ “judgment is not domestic law; accordingly, the
President cannot rely on his Take Care powers here”).
214. Young, supra note 11, at 130.
215. Id. at 131.
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matter of good governance and because administrative procedure and con-
stitutional substance are not necessarily independent of one another.216 But
it is a concern that can be addressed by building procedural protections
encouraging regularity and accountability into the implementation of trea-
ties, just as they have come over time to be built into the implementation of
statutes.
That executive branch administration of treaties can be constitutional
does not mean that it is without constitutional limits. Most importantly,
power must in fact be delegated to the executive branch to administer a
treaty before it can constitutionally do so. What it would take for such dele-
gation to occur is discussed later in this Part. In addition, a treaty can only
delegate power to the executive branch to do something that a treaty can
authorize within our constitutional system. Thus, a treaty could not consti-
tutionally authorize the executive branch to appropriate funds, given the tex-
tual and historical basis for concluding that the appropriation of money can
be done only by Congress.217 The appropriations power in turn could serve
as a congressional check on executive branch administration of treaties, just
as it does with respect to executive branch action more generally.
Medelĺın potentially complicates the constitutionality of treaty delega-
tions to the executive branch. A broad reading of Medelĺın suggests that a
treaty cannot delegate authority to the executive branch to translate treaty
provisions into domestically enforceable obligations. Medelĺın states that “a
‘non-self-executing’ treaty does not by itself give rise to domestically en-
forceable federal law”218 and further that “the non-self-executing character
of a treaty constrains the President’s ability to comply with treaty commit-
ments by unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.”219 This
language seems to entrench a binary approach, such that treaties must either
be domestically enforceable by themselves or instead be implemented by
Congress. If this were the case, then the executive branch would never be
able to administer a treaty that was not “by itself” domestically enforceable
in a way that would give rise to court enforceability. This in turn would
suggest that a treaty provision cannot authorize the executive branch to
make regulations that are enforceable in court unless the treaty provision is
itself immediately enforceable in court.
But such a broad reading would be inconsistent with the internal logic
of Medelĺın and more generally unpersuasive. Medelĺın concludes that the
president could not make the treaty provision at issue enforceable in the
courts because a “non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is one that was
ratified with the understanding that it is not to have domestic effect of its
own force. That understanding precludes the assertion that Congress has
216. E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law,
110 Colum. L. Rev. 479, 487–504 (2010).
217. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 11
cmt. i (Am. Law Inst. 1987).
218. Medelĺın, 552 U.S. at 505 n.2.
219. Id. at 530.
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implicitly authorized the President—acting on his own—to achieve precisely
the same result.”220 Medelĺın thus grounded its conclusion that the president
cannot execute a non-self-executing treaty in its perception that this was the
intent, as manifested through text, of the actors involved in the ratification
of a treaty. (These actors are the Senate, which advises and consents to a
treaty, and the president, who then ratifies it.)
The conclusion that the president cannot implement the treaty because
the Senate did not intend this is quite different from the conclusion that a
treaty per se cannot authorize the executive branch to implement a treaty
through rulemaking or other forms of administrative action. Reading Medel-
ĺın in the former way does not bar the president and the Senate from choos-
ing to make a treaty enforceable through executive branch administration
(which in turn raises the further question, discussed shortly, of how such a
choice would need to be manifested).221 Understanding Medelĺın to center on
intent makes its approach to treaties more consistent with the Court’s ap-
proach to statutory provisions, including its decision over time to recognize
that “not self-executing” statutory provisions can be ones that give the role
of intermediary to the executive branch. It also means that Medelĺın does not
impliedly invalidate the domestic applicability of treaty provisions, like the
one in the Chippewa treaty, that clearly delegate administrative authority to
the president. Finally, understanding Medelĺın to focus on intent embraces
the value of trusting the political branches with flexibility in institutional
design. By contrast, as Paul Stephan has observed, a flat insistence on “either
judicial rule or an insistence on express legislative authority impedes, rather
than promotes, international cooperation and, in important ways, the pro-
gressive development of international law.”222
B. Practical Desirability
For treaties to delegate regulatory authority to the executive branch, it is
not enough that such delegations be constitutional. This practice should also
be in the public interest and, pragmatically speaking, the president and the
220. Id. at 527 (emphasis added). Medelĺın suffers from scrivener’s errors, and the word
“Congress” may be meant to be “Senate” in this quotation. Cf. id. at 512–13 n.8 (mistakenly
describing a treaty as something “negotiated by the President and signed by Congress”).
221. This focus on intent is consistent with the approach taken by other scholars. E.g.,
Bradley, supra note 11, at 176–79; Ingrid Wuerth, Medellı́n: The New, New Formalism?, 13
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1, 3–5 (2009).
222. Stephan, supra note 12, at 33. Although Medelĺın thus does not present a categorical
bar to treaty implementation through executive branch regulation, it does complicate the
choice of terminology. By equating the term “non-self-executing treaties” with the need for
congressional implementation, it may make it hard to use this term for treaties that require
intermediary action by the executive branch. David Sloss has suggested accepting the term
“non-self-executing treaties” as a term of art that refers to treaties which need congressional
implementation, while using the term “executory” more broadly to refer to treaty provisions
that require intermediary actions. See Sloss, supra note 11, at 145. I do not think the terminol-
ogy matters much as long as there is substantive recognition that the executive branch can play
similar roles for treaties as for statutes with respect to their administration.
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Senate would also need institutional reasons to approve such delegations.
These reasons exist, and they are closely connected to other, broader devel-
opments in foreign relations law.
The treaty-making process provides a path for U.S. engagement in inter-
national cooperation, while at the same time conditioning this engagement
on strong, supermajoritarian support. In practice, the only treaties that
make it through the Senate have bipartisan support and indeed typically lack
any strong opposition. From 2001 to 2010, for example, only one treaty re-
ceived the advice and consent of the Senate where there were any recorded
votes in opposition.223 Once a treaty has gone through this challenging re-
view, the value of further legislative process—of needing a second law of the
land to implement it—is likely to be small relative to the costs of this pro-
cess. It takes further energy and effort from the political branches to obtain
implementing legislation—so much that the process can take years or even
decades.224 This in turn keeps the United States from joining treaties that a
strong supermajority recognizes as advancing the nation’s substantive
interests.
In addition to these policy-based reasons, in rare cases there might also
be advantages from a constitutional perspective to having a treaty delegate
authority directly to the executive branch rather than requiring implement-
ing legislation. In a recent case about the treaty power, Bond v. United States,
two justices took the position that Congress lacks the power under the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause to pass implementing legislation for treaties and
thus that there must be a separate basis in Article I for all implementing
legislation.225 This position is contrary to existing precedent and poorly rea-
soned.226 If the political branches are concerned that it might eventually be
adopted by the Court and wish to ensure the implementation of a regulatory
treaty that might address matters outside of Congress’s Article I powers,
then they should favor direct delegations to the executive branch.
From an institutional perspective, the president should also favor the
approach proposed here. The president should prefer a process that eases the
making of treaties, since the president can already ensure through his or her
control of treaty ratification that the United States only joins treaties that
accord with presidential policy. The president should also be content with a
process that has the effect of leaving the executive branch with considerable
control over implementation.
The incentives of the Senate are more complex. Institutionally, the Sen-
ate might value the role played by implementing legislation, which gives it
223. Galbraith, supra note 138, at 287 (noting that the New START Treaty with Russia was
the only such treaty).
224. See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. This discussion assumes that imple-
menting legislation does not already exist. Where implementing legislation predates the treaty,
as with radio treaties, then having the treaties effectuated through this pre-existing implement-
ing legislation presents no difficulties. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
225. 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2099 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
226. See Galbraith, supra note 81, at 65–81.
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the chance to weigh in a second-time round. As discussed shortly, however,
the Senate could retain the influence it exerts through implementing legisla-
tion by having its resolution of advice and consent include conditions that
are presently left to implementing legislation. Moreover, the decision of
whether to authorize executive branch implementation or instead to wait for
implementing legislation is a determination that the Senate can make on a
case-by-case basis, just as it already makes determinations about self-execu-
tion on a case-by-case basis.227 Recognizing that executive branch implemen-
tation is a viable option does not mean that the Senate needs to exercise it in
every case. It does mean that where the Senate cares about the benefits that
come with joining the treaty, it has a way to make these benefits materialize
with more speed and certainty.
In addition to case-specific incentives, there is an overarching institu-
tional reason why the Senate should favor a shift towards executive branch
implementation. The more cumbersome the process is for making treaties,
the greater are the president’s incentives for ceasing to make treaties alto-
gether. As noted earlier, the more the president needs both two-thirds of the
Senate and a separate vote from a majority of Congress for a treaty, the more
the president is incentivized to try to make international agreements on his
or her own or in conjunction only with Congress.228 In trade, which is one
of the areas where implementing legislation for treaties did become common
in the nineteenth century, all major international agreements have already
come to be done by Congress and the president rather than through trea-
ties.229 If this shift occurs across the board, then the Senate will lose its tradi-
tional constitutional prerogative, and the higher voting threshold of two-
thirds that accompanies it. Modernizing the process of treaty implementa-
tion may be necessary to ensuring the future use of treaties.230
Although the approach described here would thus have institutional
benefits for the president and overall for the Senate, it would reduce the
power of the House of Representatives. This is in keeping with the Framers’
“explicit and unambiguous” decision to make the treaty-making process
unicameral rather than bicameral.231 In practice, however, the House of Rep-
resentatives has long sought to play a role in treaty implementation, and its
227. See Medellı́n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, at 541, 546–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
228. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
229. See Galbraith, supra note 138, at 290–91.
230. There is a further issue of power shifts at the committee level within the Senate. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee is the Senate committee with jurisdiction over treaties,
while implementing legislation on the Senate side would go through whatever Senate commit-
tee has jurisdiction over the subject matter covered in the treaty. The leaders of these other
committees might resent the increased power that the approach advocated in this Article gives
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. If such concerns were to arise, they could be
potentially be addressed by consultation on a treaty-by-treaty basis between the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and whatever committee had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
treaty at hand.
231. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 955 (1983) (observing that the “Senate alone was given
unreviewable power” to act “independent of the other House” with respect to treaties).
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members might resent any developments that have the effect of reducing
this role. While the appropriations power is the only formal constitutional
tool that the House could bring directly to bear, its members could use other
institutional tactics to persuade the president and the Senate to require im-
plementing legislation. It is hard to predict how much members of the
House would mobilize around this issue and how the Senate would respond.
If the House were to mobilize and the Senate to have some sympathy for its
viewpoint, then we might see bargains whereby the House agrees to pass
implementing legislation speedily in return for the Senate not cutting it out.
In other words, the shadow of the shift proposed here could itself have the
effect of influencing institutional bargaining.
C. Structural Design
In deciding Medelĺın, the Court emphasized both the text of the treaty
provision at issue and the intent of the Senate with regard to that provision.
This suggests two possible places to place a treaty’s delegation of authority to
the executive branch to translate treaty directives into court-enforceable law:
first, in the text of the treaty itself; and second, in the Senate’s resolution of
advice and consent to the treaty.
A treaty could expressly specify in its text how it is to be administered in
the United States by executive branch actors. The Treaty with the Chippewas
is an example of an Indian treaty that took exactly this approach, expressly
empowering the president to take various actions including making certain
“rules and regulations.”232 By negotiating such language into the text of a
treaty—a future law of the land—the executive branch would provide not
only a clear delegation of power but also one which gives ample notice to the
Senate. For bilateral treaties, this kind of specificity is possible and indeed
currently done with respect to quasi-prosecutorial matters.233 Yet realistically
the inclusion of such language in treaties would be in tension with modern
multilateral-treaty practice. The domestic implementation of a treaty is a
matter of domestic law, and, especially for multilateral treaties, it would be
highly unusual for a treaty to include a clause about how it will be imple-
mented within the United States.
Perhaps more feasibly, the text of a treaty could delegate regulatory au-
thority by using language that is less specific and yet sufficient to confer
regulatory authority. Recall that in Fok Yung Yo, the Supreme Court held
that, where a treaty provision specified that a right was “subject to such
regulations by the Government of the United States,” this provision “mani-
festly operate[s] to commit the subject of transit to executive regulation.”234
The scant reference to “regulations” in the treaty was taken by the Court to
be a source of regulatory authority for the executive branch, even though it
232. Treaty with the Chippewas, supra note 140, art. 3.
233. See supra note 135 (discussing MLATs).
234. Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 301–02, 305 (1902) (emphasis added).
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did not clearly specify either that it was empowering regulations or that the
executive branch was the actor that was empowered.
Some multilateral treaties already contain language that speaks to ad-
ministrative action for implementation, rather than or as an alternative to
legislation. The Basel Convention on Transboundary Waste, for example,
provides that each state party “shall take appropriate legal, administrative
and other measures to implement and enforce the provisions of this Con-
vention, including measures to prevent and punish conduct in contraven-
tion of the Convention.”235 Similarly, the Rotterdam Convention provides
that state parties “shall” take measures to implement the Convention, and
“[t]hese measures may include, as required, the adoption or amendment of
national legislative or administrative measures . . . .”236 Yet another environ-
mental treaty, the Stockholm Convention, states that each party “shall . . .
[p]rohibit and/or take the legal and administrative measures necessary to
eliminate” certain uses of chemicals.237
The texts of all these treaties are fairly specific on the substance of the
regulatory schemes that they require. The Stockholm Convention, for exam-
ple, requires state parties to take quite specific steps with respect to various
chemicals, which in turn are listed by name in various annexes to the Con-
vention.238 This level of particularity goes well beyond what would be re-
quired in a statute under the “intelligible principle” doctrine. Yet although
these regulatory treaties are specific on substance, they are understandably
thin on administrative process. The texts of these treaties do not specify
what U.S. executive branch actors would carry out the requirements of the
treaty, nor do they specify what penalties, if any, would attach to private
actors who violated the treaty provisions or regulations implementing them.
These gaps could be filled at least in large part through background princi-
ples. The president’s role as head of the executive branch (and as an actor
with considerable independent foreign-affairs powers) would suggest that he
or she should be regarded as the repository of delegated power, although
able in turn to delegate to other figures within the executive branch.239 The
gap with respect to penalties is more problematic, but at a minimum the
executive branch could presumably seek injunctive relief against an actor
that failed to abide by the treaty’s administrative implementation.
235. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes
and Their Disposal art. 4, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57 (emphasis added). Where the
Convention does discuss legislation specifically, it does so without requiring it. E.g., id. art.
9(5) (stating that “[e]ach Party shall introduce appropriate national/domestic legislation to
prevent and punish illegal traffic [in hazardous waste]”).
236. Rotterdam Convention, supra note 43, art. 15 (emphasis added).
237. Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants art. 3, May 22, 2001, 2256
U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Stockholm Convention] (emphasis added).
238. Articles 3 and 4, for example, provide that the parties shall prohibit the production,
use, import, and export of chemicals listed in Annex A, except for certain specified permitted
uses. See, e.g., id., arts. 3, 4.
239. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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The text of some treaties thus already does use language that, at a very
high level of generality, could constitute a delegation of administering au-
thority to the executive branch. Yet for the executive branch to treat such
language as a delegation—or alternatively to include more specific language
in the text of treaties—it would need the tacit or, better still, explicit ap-
proval of the Senate.
An exchange between the executive branch and the Senate from a few
years ago is instructive for both the possibilities of delegations in a treaty’s
text and the limits. In 2007—after the executive branch had taken the posi-
tion in relation to the Medelĺın litigation that it could implement treaty pro-
visions that would not otherwise be directly enforceable but before Medelĺın
was decided by the Court—the executive branch negotiated two bilateral
treaties on the subject of defense trade cooperation with the United King-
dom and Australia.240 These treaties in essence sought to grant exemptions
to an existing U.S. statute regulating the export of defense-related materials,
with the exemptions to apply where the materials at issue were being ex-
ported to the United Kingdom or to Australia. (Previously the executive
branch had sought and failed to obtain these exemptions through statutory
amendment.241) Each treaty’s preamble expressed the understanding that
“the provisions of this Treaty are self-executing in the United States.”242 Ex-
ecutive branch officials “determined that, if ratified, the Treaties would be
implemented in the United States through federal regulations.”243 These reg-
ulations would provide safe harbors to the administrative and criminal lia-
bility that would otherwise attach under the preexisting U.S. statutory
scheme.244
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was displeased. The core of
this displeasure stemmed from a sense that the executive branch had at-
tempted to usurp a senatorial prerogative by including the word “self-exe-
cuting” in the treaties’ preambles. The committee report stated:
The committee notes that the inclusion in a treaty of a statement on the
purported self-executing nature of the treaty is highly unusual—perhaps
unprecedented—and is contrary to the long-standing practice that such
240. Austl. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty, supra note 7; Treaty Concerning Defense
Trade Cooperation, U.K.-U.S., June 26, 2007, S. Treaty Doc. No. 110-7 [hereinafter U.K.
Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty].
241. S. Exec. Rep. No. 111-5, at 4 (2010).
242. Austl. Defense Trade Cooperation Treaty, supra note 7, pmbl.; U.K. Defense Trade
Cooperation Treaty, supra note 240, pmbl.
243. S. Exec. Rep. No. 111-5, at 55 (2010) (statement of Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secre-
tary of State); see also id. at 57 (statement of James Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen.)
(“[B]ecause the treaties are self-executing, they are ‘equivalent to an act of the legislature’ for
purposes of Federal law. Upon ratification of the treaties, therefore, the President would have
the authority to issue regulations pursuant to the treaties themselves . . . .”).
244. Id. at 55 (statement of Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretaryy of State); id. at 86 (re-
sponse of James Baker, Associate Deputy Att’y Gen., to the questions of Sen. Lugar) (stating
that “a treaty generally cannot itself establish a Federal criminal offense” but stating that trea-
ties could “narrow[ ] the scope of[ ] criminal culpability under other Federal law”).
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matters are determined through the shared understanding of the Senate
and the executive branch. The committee strongly discourages the execu-
tive branch from including such provisions in future treaties.245
Unsatisfied with a mere rebuke, the committee rejected the position that the
treaty was to be implemented through executive branch administration. In-
stead, it extracted an agreement from the executive branch that the treaties
would be implemented through implementing legislation246 and included a
declaration in the Senate’s resolutions of advice and consent to the effect
that the treaty was “not self-executing in the United States, notwithstanding
the statement in the preamble to the contrary.”247
This exchange shows the centrality of the Senate advice-and-consent
process to decisions about how treaties are to be implemented in the United
States. The executive branch attempted an approach similar to the one advo-
cated for in this Article. It did so, however, without consulting the Senate in
advance and without offering a strong normative or doctrinal justification of
its approach. In this instance, the Senate declined to embrace an executive-
branch centered approach to treaty administration, signaling that such ef-
forts in the future would require true collaboration between the executive
branch and the Senate.
The Senate’s resolution of advice and consent to a treaty is the ideal
place for such collaboration to occur. When the Senate advises and consents
to a treaty, it frequently includes some combination of reservations, under-
standings, declarations, or conditions (collectively “RUDs”) in its resolution
of advice and consent. The resolution of advice and consent for each of these
defense trade treaties, for example, took up over two full pages of the Con-
gressional Record and included many minutia with respect to what certifica-
tions the president should provide to Congress, what the secretary of state
should consult about with the president and Congress, how various phrases
of the treaty’s implementation should progress, and many other details.248
Indeed, the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent for each treaty was
roughly as long as the implementing legislation itself.249
A resolution for advice and consent could authorize the executive
branch to implement a regulatory treaty or could flesh out an authorization
contained in the text of the treaty itself (like the language in the Rotterdam
and Stockholm Conventions about how the treaties could be implemented
through administrative measures). Such resolutions could expressly desig-
nate the executive branch actors responsible for administering the treaty,
provide specifications as to the scope of regulatory authority, and include
245. Id. at 27.
246. Id.; see also Security Cooperation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-266, 124 Stat. 2797 (2010)
(implementing the treaties). The implementing legislation for these treaties was passed with
unusual promptness, perhaps in an effort to head off support for the executive branch’s pre-
ferred approach.
247. 156 Cong. Rec. S7722 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2010).
248. Id. at S7722–24.
249. Compare id., with Security Cooperation Act of 2010, supra note 246.
June 2017] Making Treaty Implementation 1359
provisions about enforcement, such as identification of the administrative or
civil penalties. Having the Senate resolution of advice and consent be the
main venue for determining the contours of executive branch implementa-
tion would not only appease the Senate’s sense of its prerogatives, but also
take advantage of its particular expertise. As a legislative body, the Senate is
used to thinking through questions of domestic implementation in the stat-
utory context and to thinking about how to maintain adequate checks on
executive branch implementation. Given that two-thirds of the Senate must
agree to a treaty, the odds are good that careful attention would be paid to
ensuring that implementation by the executive branch occurs through an
institutional design aimed at protecting against overreaching. The process of
providing for implementation in the resolution of advice and consent might
lengthen the advice and consent process, but it would remove the potentially
far longer delays of waiting for implementing legislation.
The Senate’s resolution of advice and consent thus seems an ideal vehi-
cle for authorizing executive branch administration of treaties (or for speci-
fying the contours of such administration where the text of the treaty can be
read to provide an authorization already). It allows specificity that realisti-
cally cannot be written into multilateral treaties, draws upon the Senate’s
expertise, promotes democratic oversight, and satisfies Medelĺın’s concern
that the intent of the Senate with respect to implementation be honored.
Nonetheless, there is an important formalist concern with this approach:
that the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent might not be considered
part of the “treaty” and thus not part of the “supreme law of the land.”
Although the issue is not free from doubt, there are good reasons to
treat the provisions in the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent regard-
ing the process of domestic implementation as the law of the land once the
treaty is ratified and enters into force, as long as the provisions in the resolu-
tion are reasonably tied to the subject matter of the treaty and the president
accepts these provisions as part of the ratification process. As a matter of
form, this approach requires the approval of the domestic treaty makers the
president and two-thirds of the Senate—and thus satisfies all the domestic
constitutional checks built into the Treaty Clause.250 As a matter of practice,
both the Senate and the president have effectively come to treat the provi-
sions in a Senate resolution of advice and consent as controlling with respect
to the treaty’s implementation251—even where the text of the resolution is in
250. By contrast, the one-house legislative veto overturned by the Supreme Court in the
statutory context failed to go through the institutional checks set out in the Bicameralism and
Presentment Clause. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945–51 (1983); cf. Curtis A. Bradley &
Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 399,
444 (2000) (observing that RUDs “are analogous to a bill passed by both Houses of Congress
and sent to the President for his approval or veto”).
251. Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 303 cmt. d (Am. Law Inst. 1987) (stating that “a condition [in the resolution of advice and
consent] having plausible relation to the treaty, or to its adoption or implementation, is pre-
sumably not improper, and if the President proceeds to make the treaty he is bound by the
condition”).
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contrast to the text of the treaty, as in the case of the defense trade treaties
with Australia and the United Kingdom. This approach is particularly nota-
ble with regard to human rights treaties, where the Senate resolutions of
advice and consent have included declarations that the treaties are non-self-
executing. In defending the constitutionality of these declarations, Curtis
Bradley and Jack Goldsmith point out that these declarations “are included
within the U.S. instrument of ratification, and other nations are therefore on
notice of the declarations and have an opportunity to object to them.”252
Provisions in a Senate resolution of advice and consent that authorize or
tailor executive branch implementation of a treaty could similarly be in-
cluded by the United States in its declaration of ratification.
One important limit to consider on the approach proposed above has to
do with criminal penalties. There is a long-standing belief that treaties can-
not constitutionally criminalize conduct directly. Whether or not this belief
is sufficiently supported as a matter of constitutional law,253 the exception-
ally strong tradition of involving the House with respect to criminal penal-
ties is one that the Senate probably would not wish to depart from in the
foreseeable future. If a treaty provision obligates the criminalization of cer-
tain conduct, as is the case with some regulatory treaties, then implementing
legislation will accordingly be needed. In future negotiations, however, the
United States might do well to negotiate for the phase in of criminal penal-
ties, such as a provision that legislation providing for criminal penalties shall
be passed within four years of a treaty’s entry into force. If such a provision
were in place, the United States could join the treaty without waiting for
implementing legislation with respect to criminal provisions.254
In short, for a treaty to delegate regulatory authority to the executive
branch in a way akin to statutory delegations, either the text of the treaty
should contain such a delegation (even if in very general terms) without
disagreement from the Senate, or the Senate’s resolution of advice and con-
sent should specify such a delegation. Better still, both would occur. Turning
to examples mentioned earlier in this section, I do not think that the execu-
tive branch has the authority to implement the Basel Convention through
administrative rulemaking. When the Senate advised and consented to this
treaty in 1992, it did so following representations by the executive branch
that implementing legislation was necessary.255 The Senate’s resolution of
advice and consent was silent with respect to implementation,256 and thus
those who refuse to use legislative history might consider that the text of the
treaty is sufficient for an executive branch delegation. Taking the legislative
history into account, however, such an approach seems untenable. But for
252. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 250, at 449.
253. See supra notes 131–133 and accompanying text.
254. If the implementing legislation failed to materialize, the United States could with-
draw from the treaty. The prospect of such withdrawal might in turn serve as a useful deadline
for getting the implementing legislation passed.
255. See S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-36, at 15–16 (1991).
256. See id. at 17.
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treaties going forward, the executive branch could seek the support of the
Senate during the advice and consent process for executive branch authority
to implement treaties. The Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions men-
tioned above are examples of such treaties, since they are presently awaiting
advice and consent in the Senate.257
D. Administrative Complexities
The core argument of this Article is that the transformation of treaty
provisions into court-enforceable obligations can and should rely far less on
congressional implementing legislation and far more on executive branch
implementation. If this comes to be, then the political branches and the
courts will have to determine the extent to which core principles of adminis-
trative law that have developed with respect to statutes apply similarly to
treaties. In what follows, I briefly identify three of the possible areas in which
these issues might arise.
One area is the extent to which a regulatory treaty can delegate adminis-
trative authority to actors other than the president. There are precedents in
the treaty context for considering issues of delegation—recall, for example,
that in Holden v. Joy, the petitioner unsuccessfully argued that a treaty could
not confer power on the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of
the General Land Office.258 The further the delegations get from executive
branch actors subject to robust presidential control, however, the more
room there is for debate. For example, could a treaty constitutionally dele-
gate authority to an independent regulatory agency, and under what condi-
tions should the treaty be interpreted to do so? Similarly, could the treaty
delegate administrative decisionmaking power to an international organiza-
tion, such that the executive branch would then be required to implement
whatever future decisions were made by this international organization?
These issues will undoubtedly present complicated choices in the first in-
stance for the president and the Senate in the making of a treaty and poten-
tially for the courts down the road.
A second area is the extent to which executive branch administration of
treaties is bound by or should accept the constraints of procedural regularity
and judicial review that have developed in the administrative law context.
For example, to what extent would rulemaking require notice-and-comment
procedures and be subject to judicial review, and what would the standards
of review be? The Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to the presi-
dent,259 but many of its provisions would be relevant for treaty delegations
to agencies.260
257. Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. Dep’t St. http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pend-
ing/ [https://perma.cc/N3Q2-AXLY]. Neither treaty requires parties to pass criminal legisla-
tion. See Rotterdam Convention, supra note 43; Stockholm Convention, supra note 237.
258. 84 U.S. 211, 225 (1872).
259. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992).
260. The text of the Administrative Procedure Act focuses on agencies and their actions.
On occasion, its provisions make specific reference to “statutes,” but much of its language is
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A third area is a cluster of issues related to the legal status of rules issued
pursuant to a treaty delegation. Under what conditions does this rule carry
the force of law, including the authority to preempt state law? If a rule made
pursuant to a treaty appears to conflict with a statute or a rule made under a
statute (or a different treaty), how are the conflicts to be resolved?
The answers to these kinds of questions will doubtless in many cases be
difficult or context specific. Yet these questions all have statutory analogues,
including some from the foreign-affairs context. With regard to delegation,
there is vast literature and practice on statutory delegations to executive
branch actors, including administrative agencies, as well as at least some
initial case law on statutory delegations to international organizations.261
The question of administrative law constraints on presidential action is al-
ready an important issue in the statutory context.262 There is also a substan-
tial body of precedent in the statutory context on issues like the reach of the
APA provision that exempts foreign-affairs issues from notice-and-comment
rulemaking and on whether extra deference is appropriate for administrative
action implicating foreign affairs.263 Finally, the extent to which administra-
tive rules constitute laws has received extensive attention with regard to
statutes.264
That these issues all have analogues in the statutory context does not
mean that the treaty context should borrow these answers wholesale. The
Senate would likely choose to provide tailor-made procedural safeguards in
its resolutions of advice and consent, and there might be reasons why the
default presumptions should differ somewhat between treaties and statutes.
In general, however, the answers that have developed through practice and
experience in the statutory context should provide a useful starting point in
the treaty context. The statutory analogues also show the answers in large
part can and perhaps should develop in the process of application rather
than through comprehensive initial theorizing.
broad enough to cover treaties. For example, its provision for judicial review of agency action
provides that a court shall set aside agency action “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, author-
ity, or limitations, or short of a statutory right” without having an equivalent provision for
treaties. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(c) (2012). But the broader catch-all within this provision, which
provides that a court shall set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” does not require that the agency action
be pursuant to a statute as opposed to a treaty. Id. § 706(2)(a).
261. On the latter issue, see, for example, NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1 (2006), and Kristina
Daugirdas, International Delegations and Administrative Law, 66 Md. L. Rev. 707 (2007).
262. E.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 Vand. L.
Rev. 1171 (2009).
263. See Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 Cornell L.
Rev. 735, 773–77 (2014).
264. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:
The Original Convention, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 467 (2002).
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Conclusion
“We live in an integrated world . . . . And if we cannot work together
more effectively, we will all suffer the consequences.”265 This vision of coop-
eration—put forth here by President Obama but shared far more widely—
requires that the United States have the constitutional capacity to engage
internationally. Yet the existing constitutional process for entering into regu-
latory treaties is largely ineffective. The need for the executive branch to first
negotiate an international treaty, then have it advised and consented to by
two-thirds of the Senate, and then get implementing legislation from Con-
gress (in addition to whatever further administrative rulemaking is needed)
is cumbersome and can be prohibitively so. International regulatory cooper-
ation is thus thwarted—or obtained outside the treaty context through some
combination of executive branch and congressional action.
If treaties are to remain relevant to our constitutional system, they must
be made easier to administer as the law of the land. For statutes, our consti-
tutional system has accepted the delegation of substantial power to executive
branch actors and administrative agencies as a necessary feature of effective
governance. It is time and indeed long past time for this same move to occur
with regard to treaties. Where the text of a treaty appears to authorize execu-
tive branch implementation or the Senate approves of such implementation
in its resolution of advice and consent, the executive branch should be able
to transform treaty provisions into court-enforceable mandates through
rulemaking or other appropriate agency action. Such a development would
be constitutional and frequently desirable.
265. President Barack Obama, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept.
28, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/28/remarks-president-obama-
united-nations-general-assembly [https://perma.cc/V843-AVCF].
